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NEED FOR VIGILANCE AGAINST ENEMIES STRESSED

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 21 Apr 83 p 2

[Article by Pirro Kondi: "The Class Struggle Must Be Theoretically Thoroughly Understood and Correctly Implemented in Practice" dedicated to the Thirty-Eighth Volume of Enver Hoxha's Works]

[Text] Our party, guided by Marxist-Leninist teachings, has always considered the class struggle as the main motivating force of society. Seeing it, as it is in reality, a basic issue of our victorious theory, it has always given correct guidelines in regard to the necessity, and the ways and forms of its development; it has not allowed the slightest distortion neither from the right nor from the left. This is affirmed in the best way possible by the documents of the Thirty-Eighth Volume of Comrade Enver Hoxha's Works.

All true Marxist-Leninists, wherever they are, openly and publicly proclaim, in their programs and practical activity, the incompatibility of antagonistic classes and the necessity of the class struggle and of the dictatorship of the proletariat for the extermination of oppressive and exploiting classes, for the eradication of any poisonous root which they have planted during the past centuries and during the present period and in general for wiping out the classes.

The practical implementation of the class struggle finds its expression in the entire activity of the party, of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of all our society. The general line of the party and its policy in all fields, reflect, above all, the class aspirations and the interests of the working people. Whatever is planned and carried out in our country, is done for the class and for the people. However, in the practical activity of the party and the government, there also exists a concrete field where great lucidity and maturity are required in order to achieve attitudes which are always correct in the class struggle against elements and phenomena foreign to our society.

How should the elements without [Democratic] Front cards be treated, what should the attitude be toward the kulaks or toward their children and what should the relationships of our people with them be? Those, together with other similar cases, require a clear cut attitude, and a differentiated class attitude, so as to prevent us from falling into liberalism and sectarianism. One finds complete and detailed directives and guidelines in regard to these issues in the party

untiring work, they may prove that they are doing their utmost to blot out their "stains" and to follow the same step in society. "To each person who does not have a good political attitude," Comrade Enver Hoxha says, "we will give all the necessary assistance so that he may correct himself, but always keeping him under strict surveillance, thus, depriving him of any opportunity to harm us." And, when this person does not pay attention and does not profit from the assistance given to him, but persists in his hostile attitudes and activities, then, the people in power will show him his place.

Trust and control is the motto of the party. Of course, it is not at all necessary to suspect everybody; but, to keep your eyes closed is a dangerous thing. When it is being observed that something conflicts with the line and policy of the party and is not in the interest of the people and of socialism, whoever acts in this manner, must be stopped. And, later, we will find out whether it was a mistake, an impulsive act or a deliberate act. In our society, everybody defends the fatherland, socialism and the people.

However, liberal and opportunistic attitudes are as harmful and unjust as the sectarian attitudes which are also encountered in practice. There are cases when, without taking into consideration at all the present situation and attitude of the various elements of the above mentioned categories of people, we persist in the same opinion which we used to have about them for so long. Sometimes, there is no difference at all between parents and children when there is ground for differentiation. However, Comrade Enver Hoxha says: We must have greater hopes for rehabilitation in the sons and daughters of kulaks and other elements like them, than in their parents. And, sometimes, some of their children seek to become cadres. Is it sectarianism for our society to refuse them this opportunity? Not at all. It is known that each class in power has trained its cadres from among its own children. It would be considered sectarianism if these elements were left without work. It would also be unjust and sectarian if these elements would not be invited to attend the ordinary Front meetings, because they do not have their Front cards.

The sectarian attitudes maintained in these cases clearly show lack of maturity, lack of thorough knowledge and lack of ability to execute the line and policy of the party. "It seems to me," Comrade Enver Hoxha says, "that these attitudes are held by comrades who sway and who think: 'It is much better for me to be criticized for sectarianism than for opportunism.'" These comrades, however, forget that sectarianism is also opportunism. It is opportunism, because it does not help to differentiate and to take these people away from the wrong path and from the bad influence of certain elements; on the contrary, it gives the enemy the opportunity to strengthen its influence on them. On the other hand, sectarianism is opportunism, because it is an unstable, swaying, suspicious and doubtful attitude.

As in any other field, especially, in the field of the class struggle, we must not allow equivocal attitudes from either side, neither from that side nor this side. There is only one correct attitude--the attitude which is based on the line of the party, which serves the people and socialism. Therefore, we must be strict, determined and unflinching in our attitudes and activities.

documents, in Comrade Enver Hoxha's Works and in the Thirty-Eighth Volume.

Although prescriptions for solving every case, which can be met in life, cannot be given, nevertheless, on the basis of practice and of the events of life, and by criticizing wrong actions and by giving guidelines on how to deal with special situations, an infallible guidance has been provided for every party organization, for every communist and cadre and for every activity. "The guidelines which have been given time after time, Comrade Enver Hoxha says, that is, how this struggle should be developed without any swaying and in a persistent manner, when there should be a clear cut attitude and when a differentiated attitude should be maintained, however, without falling into sectarianism or opportunism, have been and remain clear lessons with a great value."

Nevertheless, mistakes are made. In practice, one encounters cases of a kind of megalomania which leads to the underestimation of the enemy and to the relaxation of vigilance toward him. They lead to liberal and opportunistic attitudes. Is there ground for such thoughts and attitudes? Certainly not. It is a fact that we liquidated the exploiting classes in our country, but their remnants still exist. In the presence of the force of the people in power, they do not dare to come out openly against the government; however, they always have in their hearts the dream "to return to the lost paradise" and, when they have the opportunity, they vomit their poison and even try to harm us. We have encountered many cases like those in our life. The fierce bourgeois-revisionist encirclement, the poison of the bourgeois-revisionist ideology and the concrete aid which the bourgeois and revisionist elements try to give to them in various forms have also kept their hopes alive and are encouraging other new enemies, degenerate elements with an aptitude for careerism and adventurism and scoundrels to embark on a hostile road. The remnants of old, backward and reactionary ideologies and customs are also hotbeds for hostile activities.

The people say: "The water sleeps, the enemy does not sleep." Under our conditions, where we are progressing with certain steps on the road to the complete building of the socialist society, while we have defeated, one after the other, all attempts of foreign enemies and of their agents within the country, from Koci Xoxe and his friends to Mehmet Shehu and his band, it has been the tactic of our enemy to act as the "smoldering fire." He tries to show himself as a "good element and a good worker," seeking to become a friend and, possibly, a relative of our people "in order to establish a biography" and so forth, so as to be able to act covertly without being noticed. Therefore, the party demands that we always keep our vigilance sharp.

We are Marxist-Leninist; we see everything in dialectical movement and development. The practice of the building of socialism in the country shows to those who are realistic how they should behave and work in our society. In fact, there are people, among these categories of people, who see that the "Old world" will never come back in Albania and that if they are honest and work faithfully, all their rights will be guaranteed to them by the government.

Without weakening its vigilance over them, our society has created all the conditions for them so that in a humble manner, without pretension and with

He who thinks that "he can get away with a sectarian attitude has, actually, strayed from the line, just as the opportunist element. In general, both are equally harmful to work.

The maintaining of this necessary equilibrium in every case and situation is linked with the political-ideological formation, with the knowledge of the line of party and with the attentive study of the party documents. The Thirty-Eighth Volume of Comrade Enver Hoxha's Works gives us an extraordinarily great help in this direction.

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NEW DECREE AFFECTS HOUSING SECTOR

Party Spokesman Explains Decree

Budapest BUDAPEST in Hungarian Mar 83 pp 2-5

/Article by Lajos Kelemen, general vice president of the City Council of Budapest "Housing Matters"/

/Text/ The new housing regulations, the overwhelming majority of which became effective 1 January 1983, completely change the rules and practices of housing construction, maintenance, management and distribution in some areas, while in other areas the regulations are modified to correspond to changed circumstances.

What necessitated and what justifies the introduction of a qualitatively new regulation for housing management and distribution? The most important motive is that housing problems have remained one of the most urgent problems of our social life in spite of the fact that, during the past 25 years, the party and the government have paid and are paying particular attention to the supply of housing. We know well that housing is an important determinant of living standards and circumstances. Suitable housing can favorably influence the mode of living of individuals and families, the raising of children, cultural self-improvement and also, through this, work achievement. Therefore, the solution to the housing problem is undoubtedly a societal matter of dominant importance.

This is even more true in Budapest, where one-fifth of the country's population lives and where nearly half of the council rental units of the country can be found. The problems are more severe in Budapest because the quantitative housing shortage is greatest here and the renovation of state-owned housing has also been delayed longest in Budapest.

It is a fact that as a result of housing construction, especially during the last 2 decades, the number of housing units increased considerably. The housing supply was increased by 200,000 units in Budapest alone. The earlier crowded housing conditions were simultaneously alleviated and the composition of the housing supply was improved: more large apartments are available while the proportion of small apartments without full utilities has decreased. These favorable results are due to the successful completion of the first 15 years of a housing construction program during which more than 1 million housing units were built, primarily to alleviate the housing shortage.

During the past 20 years, one out of two families was able to move into a new home, and this historically significant result is outstanding even on an international scale.

The housing supply inherited from the past, the necessary renovations, the increase in population and the increase in the number of families and, furthermore, the higher demands associated with the increased material well-being of society have all contributed to the fact that our worries and problems in the area of housing remain. All these together made a second 15-Year House Building Plan necessary. This plan calls for the renovation and modernization of several thousand housing units by 1990, in addition to the new construction of 1.2 million units. By 1982, about half of the 15-year project was completed.

The scarcity of housing units in Hungary is estimated at somewhat less than 200,000. At the current pace of construction, many housing units can be built in 5-6 years. But the problem is not the absolute numbers but rather regional distribution and the fact that in large cities, for instance in Budapest, housing construction cannot keep in step with the demand.

Without doubt, a final solution to the housing problem can be decisively achieved only through the new construction of a sufficient number of housing units. In view of the capacity and economic circumstances of the national economy, this can be foreseen even less without increased financial cooperation between the state and the population. Our society accepts and supports the efforts of families and individuals to create a home since state support, credit and social allowances were taken advantage of in the construction of nearly every home.

During the first 5 years of the second 15-Year House Building Plan, by 1980, there were nearly 86,000 housing units built in Budapest, 58,000 of which were built by the state. During the sixth 5-Year Plan, by 1985, in the absence of financial resources and technical possibilities, fewer state housing units will be built than originally planned. The most important projects of the intermediate-range plan, lasting until the end of 1985, were determined by the City Council of Budapest on the basis of the possibilities and the demand.

In addition to the building of 48-50,000 council housing units, we have increased our spending by nearly 50 percent on housing renovations and modernizations, compared with the previous 5-Year Plan period. The Budapest housing management and distribution program considers its preeminent task to provide housing to families with several children and to newly married couples in such a manner that the social control of housing mobility and management can be increased simultaneously.

Last year, the MSZMP Central Committee and the Council of Ministers comprehensively examined the tasks of housing construction, maintenance, management and distribution. They set as their goal the modernization of the housing supply, which would decrease the current contradictions and, in turn, would permit a more effective utilization of the given resources and tools.

In its statement, the government concluded that the expenses associated with housing construction and maintenance are distributed unevenly between the

state and the population or among various groups of the population. Differences in the chance of getting a housing unit are greater than justified. A large number of newly formed families still has a long wait before getting independent housing. The current rent of state-owned rental housing covers an ever decreasing fraction of the necessary maintenance costs. The greatest burden is carried by families who live in housing they own or who are in the process of building or buying such units. The management of existing housing units is inadequate and the management of new housing units fails to keep in step with the increased demands.

It is an indispensable prerequisite of progress that these problems be resolved as soon as possible. The way to solve these problems was spelled out in the April resolution of the MSZMP Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. The resolution was preceded by a societal debate reflecting the opinion of political, social and governmental organizations representing all strata of the population. Further, well-coordinated measures must be taken to improve the housing situation, utilizing the results of this debate.

The most important requirements of state regulations to improve housing construction, maintenance, management and distribution are:

- housing needs should be met gradually, and those entitled should receive housing within a reasonable time;
- the interest of the population in designing and building their own house should grow, and the material and technical conditions for this growth should be improved;
- the burden between state and population or rather certain groups of the population should become more equitable;
- in the acquisition and maintenance of housing units, true value and costs should be reflected more than before;
- state support should be increasingly adjusted to the social, income and wealth of the families; and
- the councils should become more independent in the local application of housing management principles and requirements, in the improvement of the housing situation and in the organization and promotion of housing exchanges.

To achieve the goals, 36 legal regulations had to be redefined or modified. The legal regulations thus defined differentiated to a better degree the possibilities of acquiring housing and expanded the ownership eligibility associated with state housing; they increased the duties and responsibilities of those using council rental housing with regard to housing unit maintenance; they increased the possibilities of exchanging housing units of different ownership status; they gave greater room to organized exchanges; they limited the possibilities to exercise rights contrary to the interests of

society; they expanded the right of employers and councils to furnish housing; they expanded the individual and credit requirements for housing construction and purchase; and they made the maintenance obligations more equitable among various kinds of owners of housing units.

These regulations introduce a qualitative change in housing construction and management. In addition to new housing construction, housing management ("secondary housing production") comes to the fore, meaning a rational utilization of already existing housing. In other words, the national economic conditions and circumstances for the realization of our housing policy goals have changed. The central resources spent on housing construction and maintenance had to be decreased.

Only 20 percent of the housing units under construction are state housing, as opposed to the 30 percent planned earlier. Therefore, in the future, we are forced and we want to rely more on the material strength and work of the population. To approach the construction of the planned number of houses, the decrease in state housing construction must be made up by increasing the construction of personally owned units. The Budapest City Council, first of all, must provide for the better utilization of state-owned areas available to a limited extent for construction. House building and purchase of personally owned units by means of funds from the OTP [National Saving Bank], enterprises and private resources should be fostered. The work of house building cooperatives must be aided. The situation regarding the delivery of improved services by the construction industry and the administrative processes of public agencies should be reexamined.

In all these areas, accomplishment according to the expectations of the new situation should be facilitated in such a manner that the quality of material supply and services can be improved, the duration of official procedures can be shortened, permission can be granted more rapidly and building lots can be supplied more democratically.

The new housing ordinances and changed regulations give the councils broad independence. They were charged with the organization to solve the new problems. Their sphere of action and thereby their responsibility for the formulation of the housing situation is growing. Government-level decisions merely guide with respect to a series of important question, and the councils are empowered to shape the concrete regulations. But this necessitates that the councils reexamine their regulations regarding housing management in tune with the higher-level decisions and legal rules.

The reexamination and finalization of the housing ordinances of the Budapest City Council were preceded by broad and gradual work to unify views and gather opinions.

In association with the modernization of housing management and distribution, opinions were aired by the leading bodies of the party, social and state organs of Budapest. It was confirmed that the housing policy guidelines applicable to the sixth 5-Year Plan of Budapest will continue to serve as the basic document for house building, maintenance and management activities.

Acquainted with the requirements of the new situation, the Budapest City Council formulated ordinance No 2/1982 concerning the distribution of housing under the authority of the council, the management of the housing units and the social evaluation of housing claims and also ordinance No 3/1982 concerning payment upon acceptance of housing units, the rent and the range within which rents and acceptance fees may be increased or decreased.

The principal forms of obtaining housing remain unchanged. Housing will continue to be distributed by allotment by the council or by the designation of buyers, by building, purchase or exchange. The income and wealth conditions of acquiring housing which represent varied financial burdens remain essentially unchanged in Budapest and are basically in agreement with earlier regulations.

Also in the future, a claimant without housing will be entitled to receive council rental housing on a social basis only if the per-capita average monthly income of the family does not exceed 2,200 forints and the value of its wealth does not exceed 80,000 forints. By leaving the income limits in existence since 1979 unchanged, social rental housing is distributed among families with below-average income. A new regulation is that the Budapest City Council makes it possible for someone to obtain rental housing on the basis of the size of the family, the number of children and dependents, and also to exchange claimants in cases where the per-capita average monthly income does not exceed 3,500 forints and the wealth does not exceed 80,000 forints, provided that the individual agrees to pay three times the housing acceptance fee. Thereby we promote housing mobility because, instead of the housing which is distributed by the council and which will be discontinued at the end of the intermediate plan period, a large number of council rental units can be used for exchange.

We did not consider it justified to change the wealth-income limit for the right to obtain low-income cooperative housing which the council distributes, in view of the fact that this form of housing supply is gradually decreasing and will be discontinued. Thus, those claiming such housing are entitled to it if the per-capita average monthly income of the family is less than 3,500 forints and their wealth does not exceed 200,000 forints.

With respect to income limits, we have also provided in the ordinance that if such is exceeded minimally, housing can be obtained in a manner representing a lower burden. We provided the executive committees of district councils with the discretion to weigh the situation in cases where the per-capita average income and wealth of the claimant do not exceed the income and wealth limit of the given entitlement by more than 10 percent.

We made possible the equitable evaluation of housing requests by old people in such a manner that those who do not have independent housing are living alone on retirement benefits or as a retired couple can be assigned a one-room council rental housing unit even if their per-capita average monthly income does not exceed 3,500 forints and the value of their wealth does not exceed 80,000 forints. The income limit of single individuals or single parents will continue to be determined in terms of 300 forints more than the basic limit.

We expanded the possibilities of obtaining housing by competition through a few types of housing allocation such as the conversion of space intended for non-housing use, the subdivision of housing, etc.

It is a fundamentally new regulation that housing in state-owned buildings which in the course of rehabilitation of whole blocks had been evacuated because of technical conditions but which can be restored will be sold on the basis of competition if the claimant accepts responsibility for renovation and modernization of the unit. By involving the private sector, the demolition of housing and buildings which can be rehabilitated can be averted. Those who accept the responsibility to renovate can receive state support under the conditions valid for new housing.

The housing management guidelines, in addition to stimulating the rate of housing exchanges, also set the goal of allocating housing units in a gradual manner. Housing claimants living in Budapest, irrespective of their occupation, will be able to obtain housing in several steps in the future, that is, they can improve their situation gradually. Gradualness means that housing claimants entitled to council rental units will, in general, receive as their first housing a more modest unit, most of them vacant and not exceeding the minimal number of rooms for which they would be eligible.

For housing exchange claimants who have subdividable housing, the number of rooms to be allocated in council rental housing and in discounted housing sold by the council was determined, in general between the lowest and highest limits of the claim. In the case of personally owned housing units which were sold without discount and allocated by the council, it is generally purposeful to allocate units with a number of rooms up to the limit of the housing claim. The housing management authority decides on the number of rooms and degree of comfort in the house to be allocated, depending on the composition of the available housing, weighing the type of work and position of the claimant and seeking the advice of the social council.

In the case of those who do not have any housing, gradualness should be interpreted in such a manner that their first independent housing could be more modest, in general a council rental housing unit without comforts, even for those claimants who are entitled to them on the basis of their wealth and income status. Thereby we provide young people primarily with their first housing, which represents a basic necessity. In addition to providing them with housing on a temporary basis, we inform them of the need to provide the material conditions for further advancement and for receiving housing in accordance with their justified claim, and we advise them of the necessity to save for it. Their agreement to save for it makes it possible for the council to plan realistically for the satisfaction of demands at a specified time, on the basis of housing claims, the number of housing units under construction, the mix of diverse forms of housing available for allocation and the number of rooms. Those claiming housing can weight their possibilities and can prepare for the assumption of increased financial burdens in a more purposeful manner.

Housing claimants who accept this savings program give a written declaration to the housing authority that they will pre-pay the amount of the installments necessary for the form of housing claimed until the date set to receive the housing and that they will return the temporary housing allocated to them in a habitable condition at that time. The council is obliged to enable those who complete their savings program by the deadline to purchase a housing unit. Should a claimant not complete the purchase, he can request that he be issued the temporary housing in which he lives on a permanent basis upon payment of the basic acceptance fee. If the housing claimant does not fulfill his obligation for pre-payment by the deadline, he can request that the house in which he lives be issued to him under conditions determined for non-social rental housing, or he is required to return the housing, empty and in a liveable condition, by the end of the deadline.

A new element of the regulations involving housing is that, in limited numbers determined by the annual housing distribution plan, council rental housing units can be given also to those who are not entitled to council rental units on the basis of their income and wealth but who assume the payment of a multiple of the housing acceptance fee and also the payment of rents higher than the general rental tariff. This form of housing is called non-social council rental housing.

Unchanged is the requirement that claims for housing in Budapest can only be accepted if the claimant has been a permanent resident of Budapest for at least 5 years or has been continuously employed in Budapest for the same time. A new regulation is that, in certifying the working relationship, the sum of all employment in Budapest during the 10 years preceding the claim can be taken into consideration.

It is known that, in 1981, the renewal of housing claims was accomplished. Experience since then indicates that the records kept by the council no longer contain completely valid data. This circumstance and the modifications in the system of housing management plus the increase in the proportion of those housing units under construction which will provide housing types requiring greater financial burdens necessitate the repeated reexamination of housing claims recorded in Budapest. This will be accomplished by the end of the first half of 1983.

In addition to renewing the housing claims, they are introducing claim deposits. This is justified by two factors, among others. On the one hand, it is necessary that the councils should have precise records of housing claims at any given time and, therefore, the claimants must become interested in reporting any changes. On the other hand, claim deposits will be an added inducement for anticipatory saving with respect to every type of housing. The realistic setting of the amount of deposit can form a suitable basis for the claimant to have sufficient assurance that he can fulfill his payment obligations at the time he receives the housing.

On submission of the housing claim, a sum determined by the type of housing claimed must be deposited in the National Savings Bank. In differentiating,

the councils are taking into account the socioeconomic situation of the claimant and the size and quality of the housing claimed. The sum of the claim deposit is between 2,000 and 7,000 forints in Budapest. When housing is obtained or when a claim is withdrawn, the claimant can have the money returned with a 2 percent interest within 1 year and with 5 percent interest after that. In certain cases, for instance, in the case of a single parent bringing up a child, the claim deposit can be lowered by 50 percent. In the case of retired people or those having no additional income, the deposit for a 1-room council rental unit can be decreased to 1,000 forints.

The higher-level regulations enlarged the role of the council's real estate agency in housing unit management. The council's real estate agency will exchange units available to it under regulations for exchange between citizens for a fee which is set proportionally to market conditions.

The Real Estate Agency of Budapest, by using the units allocated to it for exchange purposes, promotes the better utilization of council rental units, housing exchanges originated by the population and the arrangement of the buying and selling of property owned by the citizens. Furthermore, by searching for housing in excess of the need, it must help to enliven the exchange in housing. Its goal must be to bring about multiple housing exchanges within the possibilities of the units available to it.

By renewed regulation of the council ordinance, we enlarged the discretionary authority of district councils. In order to simplify the procedures and to accelerate allocations, we have relieved the executive committee of certain tasks. The approval of the list of names remains exclusively within the authority of this body but regarding the kind of housing to be issued to the claimant--whether it is new, to be vacated or of a different degree of comfort or number of rooms--will be decided in the future by the housing authority after taking into account the opinion of the social committee.

The goals planned for housing management and distribution can only be achieved if we successfully complete the house construction goals of the sixth 5-Year Plan. An increase in housing exchanges can also be imagined only if we possess exchange units of appropriate room number and type. Therefore, during the remaining years of the plan period, housing units with a greater number of rooms must be built and, in addition, housing management conditions must be developed which promote the freeing up of large housing units. This can be done by the continued liquidation of shared rentals and by acceding to the request of relatives who live in shared units but who wish to move apart.

It is a problem associated with housing under construction that there are relatively few housing units with 2.5 or more rooms, which are suitable to accommodate families with several children. There is little possibility to increase the number of rooms that are under construction currently in progress, have been initiated and or will be started in the future. The reason for this is that the changeover to the construction of units with more rooms can be realized only gradually because of a delay in the introduction of the new "family model" for purposes of construction planning.

Relatively few people are entitled to state housing, which is regulated by the council ordinances mentioned. Therefore, the role of individual house construction is further increased in satisfying the housing demands. The adopted central rules made the financial burdens of obtaining housing uniform. Social-political support has become uniform: the interest and duration of credit granted for construction or purchase. The amount of discounted credit depends on the number of people in the family, their socioeconomic status and the size of the housing claimed. Employers can give support to a wider range of workers, their base for housing support being enlarged. They can decide who among their workers, and to what extent, should be supported on the basis of work accomplished. Support extended from state budget is simultaneously decreased, or rather discontinued.

After publication of the position of the Central Committee and the government, rent increases and their magnitude were the problems receiving the most attention and reaction. This undoubtedly was not only as economic but also an important political decision because the rent increase causes additional expense for nearly a million families, nearly half of whom live in Budapest.

It is known by now that there will be an average 130 percent increase in rents as of 1 July 1983. Also known are the scale of increases being dependent on the degree of comfort, mode of payment, the possibilities of social support and the gradual manner in which the new rents are being introduced. But not everyone is clear what justified the considerable increase in rentals in a situation where the standard of living of the population is not increasing. The increase is decisively justified by two factors:

On the one hand, the rent of those living in rental housing has remained unchanged for more than a decade while there was a considerable increase in the maintenance costs of state rental housing. Rent income still approximated expenses in 1971, but since then it has lagged very much behind the expenses and it covers only about 30-40 percent of the maintenance costs. The difference is paid by the state. The advantage of this is felt only by those who live in council rental housing, that is, roughly about a fourth of the population. The growth of maintenance would further increase the extent of budgetary support.

On the other hand, the unchanged rent led to a situation where the gap between rents and the maintenance costs of privately owned housing became wider than ever before. Families living in houses owned by them have maintenance costs, including installment payments, which are three to four-times greater than the rent paid by those living in rental housing. At the same time, the income of those living in rental housing is, in general, no less than that of owners. If we left the rents unchanged, this would provide state support to those living in rental housing without sufficient justification because it would not be adjusted to the size of the families and their social status but would simply be automatic for everyone who lives in state rental housing or can get into this housing. It is possible that the social status of a family made it completely justified, 15-20 years ago, that they receive low rental housing, but it is not certain that it still needs this form of state support. As reflected by the data, the idea is erroneous that most rental housing is occupied by families with less than an average income.

The extent to which rents were raised and the mode of the introduction of the increases were preceded by a broadly based and objective discussion and a weighing of several proposals. Our Party and government, weighing the sociopolitical correlations of rent regulations and financial capacities of families living in rental housing, widely used the principle of gradualness in raising rents. Gradualness primarily means that, during the first year, the state will give support for 70 percent of the increase in rent, which will be decreased gradually over a 5-year period. Furthermore, large families with three or more children will receive 150 forints in a social allowance and old people with retirement income below 5,000 forints will receive an allowance to the extent of the rent increase up to 150 forints.

Social and humanitarian care is also manifested in the ordinance by taking into account the situation of old and retired people living in rental housing. The new rents are primarily an inducement to have large families living in large housing units. The old person who is left alone in a large housing unit should exchange his home for a smaller one out of sensible economic consideration and should use the saving for his everyday needs. However, if this would be too much pressure on him, if he could not emotionally part with his home, then the council must find some mode to provide support.

With respect to raising rents, the councils were given more freedom than before. Under well-defined limits, they can set differentiated rents in order to express the different values of the housing units derived from different locations within the settlement and thereby the different quality. Therefore, the council was empowered to modify the rents or the size of the housing acceptance fee in some cases and to the extent defined in the regulations. Accordingly, rents and the housing acceptance fee can be increased or lowered by no more than 25 percent in a given area.

This practice is not unknown to the population because, since 1979, there have been preferred areas in Budapest where higher rents and housing acceptance fees were assessed. But the new regulation also provides the possibility that the housing acceptance fee and rent be decreased in less desirable areas. The difference in the utilitarian value of housing can be expressed in this manner.

In particularly favored areas, near a green belt, or near good public services that are easily approached by city transportation, an increase is called for by the Budapest City Council, while in noise-polluted, run down industrial areas, a decrease is called for.

In determining the housing acceptance fee, the new regulation narrows itemized listing and provides the housing authority departments with better possibilities for weighing social circumstances, but the opinion of the social committee must be requested before a decision is reached.

The introduction of new rents affects the renters of 420,000 housing units in Budapest. The setting of rents had been well prepared and organized by the

council machinery and by the real estate management agencies. A comparison and collection of data needed to determine rents have already been started as of 1 December of last year. It is necessary to advance this work in order to be able to determine the new rents and to notify all renters in writing by 31 March 1983. We are also prepared for the eventuality that, in Budapest, because of the large number of rental units, there will be several thousand complaints and legal controversies concerning the new rents. The problems and legal controversies arising must be resolved by 31 May.

The increased rents will further increase the justified demands on property management organizations which they cannot satisfy with the current methods and organization. Progress must be made also with respect to methods and organization.

Not merely organizational change but also change in content are needed. The level of services by the property management organizations must also be raised. One must start with the fact that the basic function of the organizations must be to fulfill the so-called management tasks: running the housing complexes, their continuous and preventive maintenance, house management services and the leasing tasks belong here. To these basic functions are linked the preparation for renewal and modernization and the functions related to task assignment, completion and supervision.

In addition to fulfilling their basic duties, the restructured organizations must be capable of performing, on a contractual basis and on the request of the renters, significant parts of the maintenance obligations which are currently still the responsibility of the lessors.

The Budapest City Council wants to increase and speed up the modernization of the housing units, on the initiative of the councils and with the inclusion of private forces. In the case of the modernization of housing which can be accomplished without structural renewal and which renters assume to do themselves with the help of the private trade sector or cooperatives, the property management enterprise must provide help. Modernization will also be supported by the council property management organizations by giving permission or consent more rapidly, by a proportionally greater reimbursement of costs or by partial advances toward the costs, possibly by insuring the supply of materials and by lending machines.

In the future, housing including more than one unit or including rooms intended for purposes other than housing or mixed purpose and non-residential buildings may also be sold for specified purposes if these were previously converted into condominiums by the managing state agency. But housing units in such housing or mixed-purpose buildings, under the exclusive ownership of the state, can be sold only if at least two-thirds of the renters of these housing units request it. Purchase of the housing can also be initiated by the renters. If the renters of at least 75 percent of the housing units request it, then this request can be denied by the relevant authority only in particularly justified cases.

The fulfillment of the tasks sketched above requires an extremely great effort from the council organization and from all those engaged in property management, transfer, planning and execution. It must be clear that under the current conditions, housing problems cannot be solved from 1 day to the next. But by decreasing the waiting time of those requesting housing and by the regular support of families with children and newly married couples, we can provide a realistic perspective for families struggling with housing problems.

Letters Ask Questions

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 26 Apr 83 pp 8-9

/Answers by Dr Gyorgy Denes, chief spokesman of the Ministry of Construction and Urban Development; Dr Ilona Kovacs, head of the Management Department of the Chief Directorate of Property Management and Construction of the Budapest City Council Executive Committee; and Dr Pal Cseh, chief spokesman of the Ministry of Finance: "Legal Advice in Housing Matters: Problems, Questions about New Housing Code"/

/Text/ Many readers inquired whether the ordinance regarding the gradual increase in rents also applies to the renters of privately owned housing.

/Dr Denes/ The lessor will set the rent of the housing unit to correspond to the rent of state housing if the privately owned housing unit had a fixed rent and was subject to a legal rental contract in effect on 1 July 1983, provided that the legal rental relationship began before 1 April 1953 in whatever legal manner or, after that date, on the basis of an allocation decision by the housing authority.

If a legal rental contract is in effect on 1 July 1983, in the case of uncontrolled-rent housing, that is, privately owned housing which was leased freely by its owner after 1 April 1953 without involving the housing authority, the earlier rent can be raised if it is lower than the new rent for comparable state rental housing. In such a case, the rent can be raised to the extent assessed for state rental housing. If the sum of the earlier rent were higher than the extent of rents determined above, then it will remain unchanged until the end of the contract period.

If privately owned housing is leased after 1 July 1983, the rent will be agreed upon freely between the lessor and the renter; but this cannot be higher than twice the new rent assessed for state housing.

Regardless of whether the housing rental contract was signed before or after 1 July 1983, the rent of privately owned temporary housing cannot be more than 2.40 forints per square meter. If, based on an earlier housing rental contract, the rent is higher than that, then it will remain unchanged until the end of the contract period.

The new rents of privately owned housing will become effective gradually: between 1 July 1983 and 30 June 1984, 30 percent of the difference between the

previous and the new rent (that is, the full rent after 1 July 1988) must be paid; the remaining 30 percent must be paid in an annually prorated manner so that the new rent would be paid in full beginning 1 July 1988.

How High Can the Rent Be for Personally Owned Housing?

Mrs Laszlo Hornyak, a reader from Hajdunanas, writes: A renter has lived for 23 years in the housing of her deceased relative (2 rooms, kitchen plus utility space). At first, the rent was 40 forints; now the renter is paying 60 forints per month. The renter refuses to move out and the ridiculously low rent is paid to one of the inheritors of the house. I read about raising the rent of privately owned housing. My question is, how much rent can we charge in our case?

/Dr Denes/ The conditions for rent assessment, in general as well as in the case of individually (citizen) owned housing are contained in ordinance No 45/1982 of the Council of Ministers and implementation is described in ordinance No 19/1982 of the EVM /Ministry of Construction and Urban Development/.

According to the new regulations, the rent of housing without full utilities is 4.80 forints per square meter, an assessment which is to be attained gradually by 1 July 1988. The rental contract relationship is unaffected by a change in ownership. But the renter can only be moved out if he receives adequate housing in exchange.

Who Is Entitled to Social Support?

Mrs Laszlo Szabo, our reader in Pecs, lives in 62-square-meter, 3-room panel-housing together with her aged parents and husband. Her parents are retired but the housing is in her husband's name. They will also retire in 3-4 years. In assessing the rent, will it be taken into consideration that they live with the retired parents?

/Dr Kovacs/ The renter (or the user who lives there illegally but in good faith) of a rental housing unit affected by rent increase is entitled to social support if the renter is entitled to retirement benefits, accidental disability pension or regular social benefits on 1 July 1983. This is true only if the month pension-like benefits do not exceed 5,000 forints in the case of a single renter or if the sum of the monthly benefits does not exceed 5,000 forints per capita in the case of corenters.

Mrs Jozsef Szanto, our reader in Tatabanya, lives in an enterprised rental housing unit with her husband and son, who is on a disability pension. The unit was allocated to her husband and she, as his wife, is the corenter. Their son lives in the unit as a relative. She asks whether her son is entitled to social support associated with the rent increase.

/Dr Cseh/ The ordinance contains an unequivocal answer to the question. Only the renter of a unit subject to rent increase is entitled to social support;

those who live in the unit in another status are not. Because our reader and her husband are corenters while their son is a relative, only the corenters, that is, the couple, are entitled to social support, not the child who lives with them as a relative.

What Support Can Be Obtained for Private Construction?

Mrs Arpad Fazekas, our reader in Csigetcsép, is an educator. She is divorced and lives with her child in an unhealthy service housing unit. She would like to build but she must pay a 100,000-forint user fee just for the building lot offered to her. It is true that only 30 percent of this is in cash, and she can get an 8-year loan with 6 percent annual interest for the rest. But her remaining money is no longer sufficient to pay the 40 percent cash required for construction. What support can she expect?

/Dr Cseh/ To build the family home, our reader, because of her child, can receive a 30,000-forint sociopolitical allowance and can get a 35-year loan of 260,000 forints with 3 percent annual interest. In addition, she can also get a bank loan for up to 15 years with 8 percent interest, but the amount can be no greater than what can be repayed from her income. The sum of the loans cannot exceed 60 percent of the construction costs after deduction of the sociopolitical allowance.

The remaining 40 percent must be borne by the prospective owner, but her employer can also extend support in form of a loan or a nonrepayable grant. If the employer extends support, the proportion of payment by the prospective owner still cannot be less than 20 percent. This also includes the sum paid in cash for the lot but not the loan. Thus, on the basis of support from the employer and on the construction costs, our reader has to calculate whether her available finances will be sufficient to build the house.

Can the Rent of Stores Be Raised?

Pal Farkas, Sr., from Belápatfalva inquired whether the current rent increase applies to rental stores located in the buildings.

/Dr Kovacs/ The rental fees for stores are regulated separately by ordinance No 8/1971 dealing with the rents of non-housing premises, and implementation is provided by ordinance No 8/1971 issued by the EVM. The last increase in store rents occurred in 1979 under a modification of the ordinance. The current regulations do not affect the rent of such premises.

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CONSULTATIONS ON WCC CANADIAN PEACE CONFERENCE

International Christian Peace Consultations

Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 25 May 83 p 5

[Text] The Disarmament Consultations of the Christian Peace Conference opened in Budapest on Tuesday. Their main topic: "A New Stage of an Arms Buildup or the First Steps Toward Disarmament? What Can the Churches Do in the Interest of Disarmament?"

In behalf of the Hungarian host churches--they too are charter members of the Christian Peace Conference--Bishop Tibor Bartha, president of the Protestant Synod and chairman of the Ecumenical Council of Hungarian Churches, welcomed the conferees: the more than 150 prominent churchmen who came to our country from the United States, Canada and Europe; the African, Asian and Latin American members of the Christian Peace Conference's Presidium; and the representatives of eight world church organizations, and of the Western European and North American peace movements. The ceremonial opening session was attended by the heads of the churches in Hungary, as well as by State Secretary Imre Miklos, chairman of the State Office of Church Affairs, and Barna Nagy, secretary general of the National Peace Council.

Protestant Bishop Karoly Toth, chairman of the Christian Peace Conference, opened the consultations.

In addition to the plenary session, the consultations are proceeding in three work groups. The conferees are exchanging views on the future of detente and of the Helsinki Final Document, on the timely problems of NATO's twofold decision and its implementation, and on the question of cooperation among the various peace movements.

The consultations will end on Friday, with the adoption of the document recording the work groups' reports and the consultations' results, and of a final communique.

WCC Secretary General's Visit

Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 21 May 83 p 3

[Interview with Dr Philip Potter, secretary general of the World Council of Churches, in Budapest, date of interview not given]

[Text] The World Council of Churches will hold its sixth assembly in Vancouver, Canada, in August. Dr Philip Potter, secretary general of the World Council of Churches, visited Hungary on the invitation of the Ecumenical Council of Hungarian Churches, to gain information on the preparations for the late summer meeting. At the close of his visit, he gave us an interview.

[Question] What are the world's churches doing to strengthen peace?

[Answer] Faith is the basis of the Christian religions, faith in Christ's peace. As St Paul wrote in one of his epistles, Christ is our peace. He will dismantle the walls separating mankind.

Thus the churches want peace. Throughout the 35 years of its existence, the World Council of Churches has definitely been advocating the preservation of peace. The Hungarian Protestant member churches, which were present at the founding of the World Council of Churches in 1948, are actively serving the cause of peace. In recognition of their activity, Bishop Dr Karoly Toth is chairman of the Christian Peace Conference.

[Question] In your opinion, what are the prospects for collaboration among the progressive forces, in the interest of expanding detente?

[Answer] Naturally, the churches are not acting alone, but jointly with all those who are defending peace. It is noteworthy that most of the peace movements at present are headed by Christians. In May of last year, the Russian Orthodox Church sponsored an international conference in the Soviet Union, on the central theme of defending life from nuclear destruction. Of course, the representatives of other churches also can be found at the head of these movements.

The World Council of Churches likewise regards as its important mission the establishment of ties among the various churches. Primarily in the hope of peace and survival. This will be one of the main items on the agenda also in Vancouver. We will discuss life, and how nuclear armament threatens human life. And we advocate that it is necessary to learn to live in peace on earth.

For wars are triggered by those who want to dominate other peoples, who do not recognize the right of other peoples to live. We will be able to live in peace only when everyone recognizes that we all have a right to live and to assume responsibility for world affairs. The knowledge we have gained of creation is condensed in science and technology. Regrettably, 90 percent of the scientists and experts are working in the industrial countries, and 50 percent of them are closely linked to the arms industry. The prosperity of many developed countries depends on arms exports, mostly to the developing world. Since World War II there

have been 140 wars, mostly one poor country against another, and millions of people have died. Therefore war is a threat of the present, not of the future. The nuclear arms tests are continuing, and even a few poorer countries might become nuclear powers in the coming years, while a large proportion of mankind is living in terrible backwardness. Therefore we regard justice as a fundamental question that cannot be divorced from the cause of peace.

[Question] What topics have you discussed in Budapest?

[Answer] We reviewed mostly the aforementioned questions. We discussed also relations between church and state, and how the churches are contributing to the construction of socialist society, toward greater prosperity in Hungary.

The Disarmament Consultations of the Christian Peace Conference will be held in Hungary on 24-27 May, on the topic: "A New Stage of an Arms Buildup or the First Steps Toward Disarmament? What Can the Churches Do in the Interest of Disarmament?" More than 150 leading churchmen from Europe, the United States and Canada will attend the large-scale consultations. Representatives of the Christians in Africa, Asia and Latin America, of eight world church organizations, and of the Western European and North American peace movements also will be present. Prominent foreign experts will lecture on the progress of the disarmament talks, and on the questions of stationing new intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe.

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BACKGROUND, RECENT POLITICAL ROLE OF ARMY ANALYZED

Paris STRATEGIQUE in French Fourth Quarter 1982 pp 21-38

[Article by Maurice Faivre: "The Militarization of the Regime: the Polish Model"]

[Text] The militarization of the regime in Poland, achieved on 13 December 1981 by the declaration of martial law, is often poorly understood by Western public opinion. Some people in the West compare this action to a coup d'etat, carried out by a military junta in the Latin American fashion, combined with the calling into military service of a majority of government employees and workers. Others minimize the intervention of the Polish army as such and attribute the "re-establishment of order" to the actions of political commissars in uniform, the political police (SB) [Security Service], and militia members of the ZOMO¹ [Motorized Reserve of Citizen's Militia]. This latter point of view, which is closer to the reality, nevertheless deserves to be described further.

A study of the press and observations made by some observers support the following explanation: the Polish army, since 1956, has had an impact and an influence which, in 1981, made it possible for it:

--to fill in for a divided and discredited Communist Party; it was the general staff of the army, representing the military faction of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), which prepared for, planned, undertook, and controlled the declaration of martial law, in close liaison with the Warsaw Pact command;

--to play the primary role in the re-establishment of order, thanks to the complete control it exercised over the country and, above all, to the moral security which it provided to the operation and which disarmed the hesitating mass of the people;

--to prolong the effects of the shock of 13 December 1981 by applying strictly military methods: the whole arsenal provided by martial law, controls and inspections, military participation and strictness in the administration of government, civic action, and intelligence activity.

General Jaruzelski and his supporters thus developed techniques for gaining control of the population which are truly original, if one refers to precedents in the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. One may ask whether this is a "model" that is "transferable" to other places and other occasions.

To answer this question, it will be necessary to analyze the role of the army: in Polish society prior to 1981, in the preparation of the declaration of martial law, and in the conduct of normalization of Polish society.

The Polish Army in Society Before 1981

In terms of numbers the Polish army is the second largest in the Warsaw Pact. It does not have much autonomy of action in relation to the Soviet command. However, in 1956 it was able to reflect the image of a national army. And even though, after its intervention against the strikers in 1970, its popularity was noticeably weakened, in 1980 it still benefited from the support of a majority of the people.

The Polish army is substantial in terms of the number of troops on active duty (320,000) and in the reserves (600,000) and in terms of the number of major units and equipment: 15 divisions, 10 of which are operational; 3,400 tanks, 700 aircraft, 130 warships, and 90 tactical nuclear missiles. The decrease in the budget earmarked for defense² no doubt will not permit rapid modernization of its equipment. The fact remains that the Polish army constitutes a structured group within society which is more powerful than the internal security forces.³ It is the docile instrument of the Communist Party because of the politicization of its officers and non-commissioned officers.⁴ Its officers and non-commissioned officers strongly control 180,000 conscripts who serve for at least 2 years. It has a considerable impact on the life of the country.

Poland is linked to the Soviet Union by the Warsaw Pact of 1955 and by bilateral treaties, one related to the stationing of Soviet troops (1956) and the other related to friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance (signed in 1945 and renewed in 1965). Poland has been forced to adopt the structures, equipment, training programs, and logistical system of the Soviet armies. As an unavoidable corridor between the USSR and the German Democratic Republic, its strategic importance is considerable, since it constitutes the communications zone of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG), the most powerful formation in the Soviet army and one in the highest state of operational readiness. It has 19 divisions, 5,000 tanks, 1,200 aircraft, and 300 tactical nuclear missiles. Thus, Poland is surrounded on all sides by modern Soviet forces and affected, in Poland itself, by the presence of the Northern Group of Soviet Forces (NGSF), which has two armored divisions. Although personnel replacements of the GSFG will be transported by air from now on and part of the equipment replacements will be moved by sea, troop movements over the road and by rail⁵ continue to be vitally necessary for a group of armies which has the essential mission of ensuring the security of the Soviet border area. The great error committed by Lech Walesa was probably to underestimate the importance of his country in Moscow's strategic view.

Before 1956 the military integration of Poland was complete, as the general staff and most of the units down to regimental level were under Soviet command. The dismissal of Marshal Rokossovski and many Soviet advisers by Prime Minister Gomulka had the effect of uniting the nation around its army, which had become the symbol of a liberated fatherland. A clever policy of civic training in the barracks, recalling Poland's glorious past but without emphasizing

either Marxist ideology or Soviet domination,⁶ contributed to maintaining the people's support for their army. Furthermore, military personnel took an active part in the construction of public works of interest to the people, in assistance to the population, and in cultural presentations,⁷ and turned over control to various sectors of the economy. This popularity declined in 1970 when the army was committed against the workers along the Baltic coast, but General Jaruzelski let his dislike of this intervention be known. Among farmers and some of the workers and intellectuals the army in 1980 still had a certain amount of prestige and was a channel for national feeling.

It is true that the participation of the people in the defense of the fatherland has been encouraged by many benevolent or official institutions. This paramilitary organization of people was certainly inspired by Engel's concept of "the people in arms," a concept reactivated by the doctrine of total defense. It is worth recalling that in the Soviet Union, despite Trotsky's efforts in favor of militia formations and the nation in arms, it was not until 1942 that this was achieved under the pressure of the German invasion and the massive mobilization of the Russian people. Stalin prolonged this spirit after World War II under the name of permanent mobilization. In the 1960's the implications of weapons of mass destruction imposed the concept of total defense or global strategy, in which the moral armament of individuals counts as much as military power. This training of the mind involves two aspects: the military and patriotic training of youth, which is entrusted to teachers and to mass organizations, and the organization of the people in a notably strengthened system of civil defense. This doctrine has been applied by all the Soviet satellite countries.

In this way in Poland the Militia Voluntary Reserve (ORMO), the National Defense League (LOK), the General Civil Defense organization (PS), defense training (PO), and the Youth Badge for Defense Proficiency program (MOSO), which have millions of members,⁸ resemble their counterparts in other Warsaw Pact countries. However, beside these institutions many other and less "strictly controlled" groups flourish. Veterans have organized themselves spontaneously. The Reserve Officers' Club (KOR) sprang up in 1956. The Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy (ZBOWID) showed signs of liberalism since in 1964 it accepted the admission of veterans of the "bourgeois" Home (Underground) Army (AK). Four unions of young people take part in military training activity, but some of them refuse to be integrated into a unified federation. Many organizations are busy popularizing the army and military service: the 600 branches of the Society for Defense Knowledge (TWO), the Polish Tourist and Sightseeing Society (PTTK), the Military Dependents Organizations (ORW). The end of 1980 saw the establishment of the Union of Grunwald Patriots (ZPG), which favored the building of a free, sovereign, and just Poland. All the organizations mentioned above established links with military garrison clubs and organized visits, lectures, and joint functions with regiments of the army. The Polish Scout Union (ZHP) was established by 500 military training personnel and even participated in army maneuvers. The Polish Teachers' Union (ZNP) works closely with the political leaders of the army and takes part in the patriotic and military training of youth.

It appears from this list that the extent and the participation of numerous organizations distinguished military and paramilitary organization in Poland from its Soviet model. Thus, in 1980 the army had a privileged place in society, not only because of its military and social importance, but also because of the support of the people for the defense and independence of their country.

Preparation for Martial Law

In the course of 1981 the intervention of Polish military personnel in the life of the country provided evidence of progressive assumption of control over the affairs of the country.⁹ Certain activities were open to public view. Others, covered by secret arrangements, only became apparent after 13 December 1981. Looked at after the fact, it seems that a number of preliminary actions in preparation for the implementation of "martial law" can be identified. They may be categorized under four headings: psychological campaign, assumption of responsibility, the army's political-economic role and operational planning.

1. The army does not seem to have ignored the internal debates aroused by the wave of liberalization. A "special" military conference, held in January 1981, studied the "need for socialist renewal" within the armed forces. The conference urged a kind of democratization, condemning both "the few cadres who do not understand the need for this, as well as the young people who would like to change everything." This meeting¹⁰ no doubt led to an initial effort to influence public opinion, which the army newspaper, ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI, began to feature in early February 1981, under the slogan: "No to anarchy, yes to the renewal." Thus the campaign was aimed at preserving the interests of the country and at restoring the authority of the party and of the state on the basis of legality and independence. In the course of the summer of 1981 this call for order and for reason would lead to support for "national understanding" among all forces of the nation.¹¹

However, in fact, this was not aimed at all forces of the nation, since, beginning in March 1981, domestic enemies were denounced, including the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR), whose "purpose was the overthrow of the socialist regime." This denunciation, which was in accordance with Marxist views of conflict, constituted the second psychological theme. In September 1981, the Solidarity trade union federation was attacked in turn. The establishment abroad of an information center of this trade union group was considered a "subversive act," contrary to the "interests of the state." Solidarity's tendency to turn itself into a kind of political opposition threatens the existence of the nation," ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI wrote. The Solidarity congress in Gdansk was called an "antisocialist Sabbath." Certain statements by Solidarity against the Soviet alliance were described as "an adventurous and antinational project" (22 October). "Sooner or later, Solidarity must be cleaned of gangsters and political agitators" who follow orders of the "imperialists, enemies of the socialist fatherland, the internal political order and the international defense alliance." Finally, on 8 December Lech Walesa himself was called a "provocateur and liar."¹² It was then, in an extremely dramatic tone, that the "danger of civil war" was denounced.

While this explanation of the increase in danger was following its ascending course, General Jaruzelski made an additional statement on 1 September 1981: "The soldiers will be responsible, if necessary for the values of socialism." Military journalists confirmed this idea: "It is to us soldiers that the party has entrusted the duty to protect constitutional guarantees, to defend the nation against its external enemies and their henchmen who are working within the country" (24 October). "The armed forces are ready to serve the nation, to re-establish social and legal order," the military journalists made clear on 27 October. On 8 December they said: in the face of a "danger of civil war," "the party, the security organs, and the armed forces are ready to defend the national interest and socialism." An appeal to reason, a designation of the enemy, and recourse to the army were therefore the three themes of this clever psychological campaign. Simultaneously, pressure was exerted on Polish public opinion¹³ by the great Soviet ally: demonstrations of forces on the borders, in the Baltic Sea, and within the country; warnings by Soviet leaders; false reports in the Soviet press; meetings of the Warsaw Pact and visits by field marshals. These were just so many ways of justifying recourse to force.

2. The appeals by the military press to the soldiers, "guarantors of patriotism and socialist values," were preceded on 9 February 1981 by the nomination of General Jaruzelski as prime minister. This promotion of the minister of national defense, an old communist from 1945, chief of the army political bureau in 1960, member of the party political bureau in 1971, who had spent some time in the Stalin concentration camps in 1940 and challenged the government in 1970, was likely to give satisfaction to the hard-nosed element of the party and to the supporters of law and order, without disturbing the trade union members affiliated with Solidarity. On 30 July 1981 the cabinet included four generals, the ministers of internal affairs, mining, and administration, in addition to Jaruzelski. The Ninth Congress of the Central Committee democratically elected General Milewski, former minister of internal affairs, to the secretariat of the Central Committee. Soon, generals were to become responsible for the Party Central School, the Cadre Section of the Central Committee, LOT airline, and four provinces ¹⁴ regarded as particularly sensitive. This installation in power of the military was completed on 18 October 1981 by the almost unanimous election (180 votes to 4) of General Jaruzelski to the position of first secretary of the PZPR [Polish United Workers' Party].

In this way the Polish generals¹⁵ assured themselves from this point on of the control of the highest offices of the state: of the party, the government, the army, the security forces, and the administrative services. This assumption of authority, which was quite legal, permitted the Polish United Workers' Party, though out of favor with public opinion and torn by factionalism from within, to keep up the appearance of holding power through its military faction. Enlisted from 1943 onwards in the Polish divisions of the Soviet army and ideologically trained in the USSR, the Polish generals guaranteed the country's fidelity to Moscow. They would try to give a military command style to the affairs of the country, while maintaining a concern for national unity.

3. This new style of leadership was soon seen in the growing intervention of the army in the life of the country. Beginning in March 1981, the Military Internal Service (WSW) or military police relieved the militia (MO) in certain cities where the latter had become unpopular. On 2 August 1981 the Military Council of National Defense, which includes the commanders of military regions, defined the political and economic role of the army: to assist the economy, to fight against speculation, and to cooperate with the internal security forces. The participation of soldiers in various kinds of work became more active: in the harvests, in strengthening the State Farms (PGR), in replacing striking miners, in maintaining the railroads, and in relief operations at the time of the floods in Silesia and Pomorze. The army medical corps helped the rural people and army veterans.¹⁶ However, the most original form of intervention by the army, and the most effective, was the establishment on 24 October 1981 of 2,000 "Territorial Operational Groups" (TGO) and "Municipal Territorial Operational Groups" (MTGO) in regional and local administrative offices and in factories. Made up of an officer, a non-commissioned officer, and an enlisted man, these groups were charged with controlling supplies of food and raw materials, fighting against speculators, providing help to socially disadvantaged people, and "with directly informing the authorities regarding all negative phenomena" which they observed in their areas. It appears that the TGO's resolved many local problems and even arrested black marketers, to the satisfaction of the citizens. However, they were recalled on 22 November to "report on their activities and analyze the results obtained." They were replaced on 23 November by a small number of operational groups composed of 10 to 15 soldiers, having the task of "preparing for winter" in medium-sized cities.

4. It can be concluded that this withdrawal of the TGO's was one of the measures in preparing for the declaration of martial law. Having gained the confidence of the people, the TGO officers no doubt reported to the regional staffs the intelligence necessary for the operation on 13 December 1981. This was intelligence which the militia, its informers in ORMO, and the political police (SB) could not collect in any quantity and with the necessary precision, conditions met without difficulty by the marxists serving on the general staff.

Other preparatory measures were then taken, justified to public opinion by the state of tension which existed in the country: armed military patrols, extension by 2 months of the period of service of conscripts,¹⁷ and the deployment on 25 November of special military units. Simultaneously, the organization of the forces with a view to their commitment to action on 13 December was conducted in the strictest secrecy. In the barracks "marching units" were set up after the elimination of unreliable elements. Food supplies were stocked in military warehouses. Units of the civilian militia (MO and ZOMO) whose use was henceforth in the hands of the military, were strengthened in terms of personnel and equipment.¹⁸

The action to be taken was planned in close liaison with the Warsaw Pact. Its commander in chief, Marshal Kulikov, responsible for the security of the corridor across Poland between the USSR and the German Democratic Republic, made five to six visits to Warsaw in 1981.¹⁹ It is likely that he assumed control of logistical support, liaison with Moscow, and coverage of the operation by the Warsaw Pact land, air, and naval forces. For this purpose a special staff was set up at the beginning of December, under the orders of the Soviet general, Shtcheglov.

However, there remained one rehearsal to be held. On 2 December the civic militia (ZOMO) assaulted and captured the firemen's officers' school, which was on strike. The army took part. It blocked the way, throughout the country, of the firemen who wanted to come and demonstrate in Warsaw. In its garrison areas it remained in reserve and, in confirmation of its popularity, was applauded by the people. All the conditions had been met for the implementation of Operation "Element" (code name).

The Army Under Martial Law

On 13 December 1981 the Polish army undertook a process of "normalization," with all its forces concentrated. Its presence ensured the success of the re-establishment of order. The legal arsenal of martial law guaranteed public security. The officer corps exercised political and economic control of Poland at all levels. Propaganda activity was expanded.

1. Certainly, at the time of the lightning operation undertaken against Solidarity on the night of 12-13 December, as well as during the following days, the army did not take part directly. As an exceptional matter, a number of units or specialized formations supported the operations of the motorized militia (ZOMO) against the strikers and demonstrators. These involved the paratroops, military police (WSW), helicopters, and bulldozers. However, the cordoning off of the ground, carried out simultaneously by the Internal Defense Forces (WOW), who guarded priority installations, and by tactical divisions, which guarded key sectors, paralyzed all traffic and isolated areas of resistance.²⁰ It was probably army communications specialists who cut telephone communications. Military personnel controlled air and sea traffic. The force deployed throughout the country in a few hours was therefore very efficient. It guaranteed implementation of the curfew and was a reserve capable of rapid action in support of the militia. The militia, with its motorized units, would have been unable to re-establish order throughout the country.

This surprise occupation of the country above all had a psychological purpose which General Jaruzelski made a point of emphasizing: "The soldier serves his country. His only concern is the national interest. Our soldiers have clean hands." He thus placed the army above the internal quarrels and divisions within the party and society as a whole. As a guarantor of the interests of Poland and the guardian of patriotism and the independence of the country throughout history, the army contributed its moral authority to an operation in the national interest. Its intervention, apparently legal and limited, the integrity of its personnel, and its concern for order could only reassure the supporters of stability and rally the support of those who were hesitating.

The army was omnipresent and therefore had the effect of a dissuasive force. It thus permitted the ZOMO to carry out its repressive operations on time and in sequence. At the beginning of January 1982, order had been established throughout the country, and the army regiments returned to their barracks.

2. The proclamation of martial law (stan wojenny), in accordance with Article 33 of the Polish constitution,²¹ authorized the use of the whole legal arsenal of martial law. This included the suppression of the right to hold meetings and to move about; the control of border areas; picking up hunting weapons; a prohibition on the sale of camping equipment, cameras, radio transmitters; and forced labor. All of these measures depriving the people of their freedom completed the paralysis of the country which had been achieved by the military cordoning off of the territory. The possibility under martial law of mobilizing reservists, members of the Civil Defense Corps (PS), the military training organization (PO), the Volunteer Labor Brigades (OHP), and even civil servants and workers in companies taken over by the military, made it possible to subject them to military discipline and courts martial, whose jurisdiction was broadened. Furthermore, the right of requisitioning property and goods could be applied to the farmers who might be tempted to withhold the marketing of their produce.

3. Martial law as also an opportunity for the military to tighten its grip on all activities in the country. The Central Committee of the party was practically suspended from functioning, to the benefit of the Military Council for National Salvation (WRON), made up of 15 generals and five colonels.²² The WRON "gave orders to the government, directly addressed the country, and organized political and economic controls at all levels."

The spokesman for the WRON stated: "The party has lost much of its authority during the last few months." One of the priority tasks of the new authorities would be to reorganize the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), so that it would become again "the leading force in society and in the state." It would be a difficult task to reform established customs and to achieve ideological reunification, but it had to be done, because Brezhnev "expected that the Polish authorities would re-establish the vanguard role of the party" (statement of 3 March 1982). It appeared that voluntary resignations (20 percent of the party) and purges announced by the military were not enough to re-establish party unity, since the plenum of 25 February called for discipline and condemned "factional activities." Meanwhile, the Central Committee of the party could only "approve" all decisions made by the WRON, and this approval was imposed on all members of the PZPR on 13 March.

Another priority task, getting the economy functioning again, was closely linked to the re-establishment of order. The militarization of the major sectors of activity in the country was one of the methods of normalization used. Militarization affected the transport sector (railroads, including both urban and interurban services), postal and telecommunications service, radio and television, ports, and energy. The launching of "plans for economic operations" was also a general staff technique,²³ which was also used in the struggle against speculation as well as in the campaign for ensuring the cleanliness of the cities or the delivery of food.

The most original kind of military action was no doubt the control exercised at all levels by military commissars provided with plenary powers. The central, regional, and urban administrative services, as well as the principal economic enterprise were placed under the surveillance of hundreds of active and reserve

officers whose function was to get the country back to work, to eliminate corrupt or incapable leaders, to verify the proper functioning of the organizations they controlled, and to inform party officials as well as those of the companies concerned ²⁴ of the decisions made by the WRON. At the provincial level these commissars represented the National Defense Committee (KOK) and, in this capacity they supervised the Provincial Defense Committees (WKO) which had been activated and which were directing the regional economy and administration. Certain provinces were even subjected to "inspections" carried out by teams of officers who, in a 2-week period, reviewed the work of all institutions in the province. Finally, in the countryside Territorial Operational Groups (TGO) were re-established on 25 March. Agricultural experts were added to them, in order to help the farmers, but especially to ensure the supply of food to the cities. In this way 1,700 rural communes were placed under surveillance.

4. This political and economic control system, affecting the whole country, was combined with a psychological effort aimed at influencing public opinion. Information was strictly censored and centralized. Only the party and army newspapers were authorized at first. A single radio-television channel was manned by journalists in uniform. Posters carried the slogans drafted by the WRON. In the schools officers were charged with the conduct of civic action programs, which were ideologically directed, beginning in April 1982. Civic Committees for National Renewal (OKON) were encouraged and were established in the various localities. Furthermore, associations were used to relay the directives of the government. Certain associations accepted this kind of collaboration (ZBZZ and ORMO). Other associations appeared more reluctant to do so or were divided on the issue (LOK, ZWO, and BID). It was therefore necessary to add purges and reorganizations to the persuasive methods in use. These affected the journalists' association, the youth movements²⁵ and the teaching professions. The veterans in the ZBOWID hesitated until 23 March before approving the actions of the WRON.

The propaganda themes emphasized the need for national reconciliation and renewal. They justified the intervention of the army, which was depicted as a symbol of an independent and sovereign fatherland, the only force capable of "liquidating extremist groups." Citizens were called on to support the interests of the socialist state.

The Polish Model of Militarization

In this way the Polish army was massively committed to a program of normalization. With the way prepared by a clever campaign to influence public opinion; by the progressive assumption of the responsibilities of the government, the party, and the security services; and by the exercise of political and economic control of local echelons, the army's intervention of 13 December, which had been minutely planned, had a shock effect and ensured the paralysis of communications, preliminary conditions for the re-establishment of order. The use of military command, coercion, and control techniques proper to the military contributed to the maintenance of relative order, even if such use has not yet re-established the unity of the country nor regained the confidence of the Polish people. In particular, it seems that the younger generation continues to express a formal kind of opposition to the authority of the Military Council for National Salvation (WRON).

It would be presumptuous, after 6 months of experience, to make a judgment on the long-term and even medium-term evolution of a rapidly changing situation, in which there are many actors and influences. On the basis of the present political and military balance sheet, we will therefore limit ourselves to considering whether the experience of the Polish system of militarization might tempt other socialist leaders.

Regarding the short-term results, certain statements by Polish political leaders provide an honest view of the situation: the minister of economy stated on 25 March, "Martial law cannot reform the economy. Neither will it resolve our political problems. However, all these questions can only be resolved in an atmosphere where the Law and Order introduced by martial law are in effect." The parliamentary deputy, Osmanczyk, stated: "The state of siege had achieved its essential objective: it calmed people down." The communist leader, Rakowski, added: "It made possible a clear improvement in our relations with the socialist countries." But meanwhile the Kremlin considers that "the process of normalization remains to be accomplished." If the military authorities wish to remain faithful to Soviet ideology and to the Soviet alliance, they must in effect regenerate the Polish United Workers' Party and return to it its leading role, as the draft action program of the PZPR provides (statement of 25 March 1982). The state of war therefore threatens to be a long one, with the temptation, for the Polish military, of no longer merely controlling the various forms of activity but of directly managing affairs,²⁶ without always taking into account the WRON or plan guidelines. The possibility of a prolonged, effective suspension of the party is not excluded.

The intervention of the army in the political life of the country has furthermore produced a certain number of negative consequences in the military area: a loss of prestige for the army, which, for the majority of Poles, is no longer a national force, a guardian of independence and the values of patriotism. Beyond the guilty consciences felt by some younger officers, this decline in popularity will involve a recruitment crisis, to the point that candidates for the higher military schools will be admitted without taking an examination. The absence of military commissars has resulted in a shortage of regimental officers and a reduction in training activity, while economic difficulties delay the necessary modernization of equipment.

The only present, positive result is therefore the rapid re-establishment of public order and the existence of a strong government, capable either of maintaining its undivided authority indefinitely or of negotiating to obtain the confidence of certain social groups.

For the Military Commission this result is not negligible if you look at the situation in Poland as it was during 1981. The methods used by the Polish generals therefore are worth considering. In fact, they show²⁷ a form of originality, compared to past experiments with normalization.²⁸ Neither in the German Democratic Republic, nor in Hungary, nor in Czechoslovakia²⁸ was such a range of military procedures used, affecting all areas of command and control, staffing, jurisdiction, and administrative strictness. These techniques permitted overall, relatively flexible and purely national treatment of the Polish crisis, in which the prestige of the army was one of the essential means of action. The techniques used are testimony of a remarkable understanding of Polish realities.

Therefore, it might be tempting for socialist leaders confronted with a crisis in their own countries to have recourse to the Jaruzelski solution. But what crisis and what solution? It is clear that the other socialist countries have not encountered the situation which faced Poland in 1980-81, marked by a reawakening of civilian society. This reawakening was promoted simultaneously by the Catholic Church and the pope, by the union of intellectuals and the workers, by the existence of non-collectivized sectors of the economy and non-communist political parties, and by the national temperament. However, most political observers emphasize the serious difficulties the countries of "real socialism" are going through: the decline of the communist parties, economic shortages and growing debt, the repression of liberal and religious aspirations, a resurgence of ethnic groups, etc. In the Soviet Union the replacement of the Brezhnev team may lead to factional struggles and result in a crisis for the regime. The Romanian people are subjected to the unbearable dictatorship of the Ceausescu family. The Yugoslav federation is faced with centrifugal political currents.²⁹ In all these countries, as in Poland, the army is the docile instrument of the party. It has a certain weight and prestige in society. In effect, the armed forces guarantee the maintenance of the territorial integrity of these countries, of the Soviet border region, and of the Marxist regimes. As forces for national cohesion the national armies play an important role in the support of vital economic areas of activity³⁰. They educate the youth in the values of patriotism and ideology. Permanent relationships are developed between military formations and youth groups and military training associations. The paramilitary organization of the people is particularly well developed in the USSR, the German Democratic Republic, and in Romania, while "generalized people's defense" groups mobilize the populations of Yugoslavia and Albania.

This position of strength of the armies in these countries is therefore quite comparable to the Polish situation in 1980. The officers of the army, less compromised in the eyes of the people and better regarded than civilian officials of the party, are at the same time faithful to the doctrine³¹ and objectives of international communism. The army could therefore be used in case of a crisis in the socialist countries, not in the form of a kind of military opposition in the style of Marshal Zhukov,³² but to serve as a means for a provisional and quasi legal transfer of power, in the Jaruzelski style. For the leadership of the communist movement, the Polish model is of interest to the extent that it enables the leadership to maintain its authority and its strategic objectives. Actually, it is only a model, a complex of procedures, a tactic which would have to be adapted to the particular aspects of each country.

It is not out of the question to imagine what impact the Polish system of militarization of the society could have on the socialist community, in case it should resolve its internal problems. By displaying the decline of the communist party in concrete form it could then provide the model for a new strategy of change. However, that is just an idea.

Annex 1: Polish Acronyms and Estimated Strength of Organizations

AK	Reserve army in 1943-44 (non-communist resistance); 300,000 men
AL	People's Army; 319,500 men
DSS	Socialist Service Troops (soldiers active in the People's Army)

FSZMP Socialist Federation of the Unions of Polish Youth
 GL People's Guard in 1944-45 (communist resistance); 10,000 men
 KKP National Coordinating Committee of Solidarity [Solidarnosc]
 KOK National Defense Committee
 KOR Workers' Defense Committee
 KOR Reserve Officers' Club
 KOS Social Resistance Circles (Solidarity)
 KRN National Council of the Interior in 1944 (communist)
 LOK National Defense League (successor to LPZ in 1962); 2,300,000 volunteers
 LOT Polish Airline
 LPZ League of Friends of the Soldier (1953-62)
 MO Citizens' Militia. Officially, 56,000; probably more than 100,000 with ZOMO
 MOSO Youth Badge for Defense Proficiency
 MSW Ministry of Internal Affairs
 MTGO Municipal Territorial Operational Groups
 NSZZ Independent, self-administered trade union (Solidarity); 10 million
 OHP Volunteer Labor Brigades
 OKON Civic Committees for National Renewal
 ORMO Militia Voluntary Reserve
 ORW Military Dependents' Organization
 OTK Territorial Defense Forces; 35,000 men
 PGR State Farms
 PO Defense Training
 PPR Polish Workers' Party (before 1945); 20,000 members
 PS General Civil Defense Organization
 PTTK Polish Tourist and Sightseeing Society
 PZPR Polish United Workers' Party
 SB Security Service
 SEJM Polish parliament
 SZSP Polish Union of Socialist Students; 2 million members
 TGO Territorial Operational Groups
 TL TRYBUNA LUDU (party newspaper)
 TOS Self-Defense Units (civil defense)
 TWO Society for Defense Knowledge
 WKO Provincial Defense Committees
 WOP Polish Frontier Guards; 20,000 men
 WOW Internal Defense Forces; 25,000 men
 WRON Military Council for National Salvation
 WSW Military Internal Service [Military Police]
 ZBOWID Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy (established in 1969); 300,000 members
 ZBZZ Association of Former Career Military Personnel (established 19 May 1981)
 ZHP Polish Scout Union; 3.5 million youth members
 ZMS Union of Socialist Youth; 1.3 million members
 ZNP Polish Teachers' Union
 ZOMO Motorized Reserve of Citizens' Militia
 ZPG Union of Grunwald Patriots
 ZW ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI (Soldier of Liberty, newspaper of the Polish army)

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FOOTNOTES

1. See list of abbreviations in Annex 1.
2. 2.4 percent of the Gross National Product in 1981, or a decline of 1 percentage point in 10 years.
3. In 1980 the security forces included the Citizens' Militia (MO), estimated at 56,000 men; the Polish Frontier Guards (WOP, 20,000 men); the Militia Voluntary Reserve (ORMO, 300,000 men); and the Security Service (SB), which was closely linked to the KGB.
4. 70 percent of the officers and 35 percent of the non-commissioned officers are members of the PZPR. Some of the officers were trained in the USSR.
5. The transshipment of freight now required by the difference in railroad guages will not be required in the future due to the construction of a wide gauge line from Brest-Litovsk to East Berlin.
6. Even if the military discipline regulation, which was modified on 30 June 1977, requires "respecting the socialist norms of social life" and "inculcating in the soldiers the values of socialist ideology and ethics: patriotism and internationalism."
7. By organizing, for example, music festivals which had much success.
8. See abbreviations and estimated strengths in Annex 1.
9. Some analogies may be noted with the pacification policy carried out in Algeria: political-military government, SAS [Special Air Service] officers, and committees of public safety in particular.
10. It was not until 7 May that ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI reported the conference in January, under the headline: "Military Forces and Socialist Renewal."
11. One can relate to the same slogan the establishment on 19 May of the Association of Former Career Military Personnel (ZBZZ) which, in addition to serving the interests of its members, was "to cultivate the values of good citizenship and patriotism."

12. This denunciation was made after the broadcast over the radio of imprudent statements made by Walesa, collected by police techniques in the so-called "Radomgate affair."
13. One should say the various currents of Polish public opinion.
14. Regional administrative departments or provinces. There are 49 in Poland.
15. Particularly the directory made up by Jaruzelski (prime minister), Milewski (central committee), Kiszczak (internal affairs), and Siwicki (chief of the general staff).
16. 37,000 persons treated and 50,000 litres of blood distributed in 1981.
17. Decree of 17 October 1981. This group of conscripts, called up in November 1979, was not released from service until 8 April 1982, after 2 years and 5 months of service (1 year more for sailors).
18. Their overall strength seems to have been increased from 56,000 men to more than 100,000 men. This reinforcement reportedly began in 1970. In October 1981, militia members favorable to the organization of trade unions were eliminated. Furthermore, witnesses have stated that common criminals were reportedly incorporated in the ZOMO in December 1971. Finally, it is likely that the most politicized elements of ORMO were mobilized.
19. He stayed in Warsaw from 11 to 18 December.
20. The movements of the divisions, which were apparently complex, no doubt were aimed at not committing soldiers to action in the region of their birth. They were carefully planned and rapid. Nevertheless, they involved logistics difficulties because of their extent.
21. The jurists of Krakow declared the proclamation of martial law by the Council of State as an illegal action, as the Diet, then in session, should have been presented with a proposal for this action. The legality of the WRON can also be challenged. The government responded in advance to these views, stating that: "an extraordinary situation required extraordinary measures."
22. Including reserve Colonel Les Roman, president of the recently-established Association of Former Career Military Personnel (ZBZZ).
23. However, the technique is not new in socialist and even in capitalist countries.
24. See the reported confidences of a military commissar to communist television workers in LE MONDE of 15 April 1982. However, the authenticity of this report is uncertain.
25. Two generals were appointed to the Supreme Council of the Polish Scout Union (ZHP).

26. Disputes have already occurred between local officials and military commissars who were naturally tempted to give them orders. Eight of the largest provinces are now led by generals or colonels (Article prepared in June, 1982).
27. Certain organizations no doubt recall the precedents of 1793 or 1917: committees of public safety, commissars with the armies. However, these organizations were not in the hands of the military.
28. An historical comparison of the four programs of normalization would be necessary to determine whether the militarization of the situation in the Polish style would have been applicable to each of these particular situations.
29. The Yugoslav reserve troops were committed to action at the time of the Kosovo incidents.
30. However, many people accuse them of having condemned "non-priority" sectors to a state of under-development.
31. Only in appearance, because many of them only joined the party to serve their careers. This is also the case in Poland.
32. Having analyzed the evolution of the French Revolution, the Marxists distrust any tendency toward "Bonapartism."

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CSO: 3519/469

POLAND

REPORTERS ACCOMPANY MILITARY GROUP ON INSPECTIONS

Bydgoszcz GAZETA POMORSKA in Polish 22-23 Apr 83 pp 1,4

[Text] Has there been an improvement or has everything gone back to the old ways? If last year's inspection was good, is it now the same or can we see any progress? In these short questions is contained the sense of inspection--be it regional or territorial--as conducted by Military Operational Groups. These groups obtain the assistance of civilian groups or are invited to partake in this action by representatives of factories, institutions, social organizations or self-governing organizations. They inspect among others the activities of the state administration and its subareas like community and apartment construction, agriculture and institutions and business establishments. GAZETA reporters Marek Heyza (Bydgoszcz Voivodship), Jacek Waloch (Torun Voivodship) and Aleksander Lewandowski (Wlodawek Voivodship) accompanied the Military Operational Groups on their inspections. Here is their report.

It Is Good, But...

A Military Operational Group under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Marian Rudzinski inspected Gmina Zlotniki Kujawskie (Bydgoszcz Voivodship). This is their second and last day in this area. Too short? Rather not--it is much better here than in other gmina's and this is cutting down the time of their inspection.

The officers and accompanying representatives of the different plants and institutions (gmina and voivodship offices) have already managed to meet 10 business establishments and Gmina Cooperatives [GS]. They agreed that in comparison to last year, one can see better supply; deliveries have been made through a harmonious program agreed to last year; containers have been systematically collected and a register of deficient articles bought by personnel has been introduced. In many shops, however, there is a shortage of forms specifying work hours. We can see a change for the better in business establishments, but for example at a grocery store in Tuczno, someone noticed an uncovered electrical switch that could cause a

fire or electrocution; also in Tuczno at the sugar plant's store, someone was storing his own private meat supply in the refrigerator. At a grocery store in Pechowo, for example, there are still some problems, and at a store in Inowroclaw, there has been a match shortage for over a month.

Changes in personnel have been good at the Gmina Cooperatives. After last year's inspection, the cooperative stands in second place in the Bydgoszcz Voivodship for overall turnover. This is having an influence on supply, improving the atmosphere in society and gaining profits for Gmina Cooperatives. They are not waiting for what "falls from the distribution list," but missing buckets and nails are brought even from Silesia.

A group under the command of Ensign Kazimierz Lempicki is visiting an Agricultural Producer Cooperative at Pechowo. The cleanliness in the calf-house is almost suspicious; but the workers say that they did not know about this inspection. They have to keep very high sanitary conditions because otherwise there would be sickness and death among the animals. It is only one week's worth left to feed the heifers. Jerzy Mucha, manager of the Gmina Agriculture Service, advised that there is enough silage in Krasliwiec, so they can take from them. It is much harder to purchase 100 pipes needed for drinking when 250 cows are in the cowshed. Even when the conditions of agricultural equipment are good, it is very difficult to obtain block bearings, plow-beams and rakes for ORKAN-2. These and other problems are discussed with members of the military group as to how to manage a farm. Before leaving the Agriculture Producer Cooperative, Ensign Kazimierz Lempicki asked the manager about the situation among older people at the cooperative.

"You have a few plans for the gmina, but some of them you can reduce. Why do you inform by letter the chiefs of various units concerning the need and deadline for certain savings programs, when you see these people every days?! This is a waste of paper," stated Lieutenant-Colonel M. Rudzinski during his discussion with the head of the gmina about his management style. We can go to the Agricultural Circles Cooperative [SKR]. There also there are not many critical comments after inspection.

Prior to departure from SKR, a woman came forward and said, "I have a matter to take up with the commissioner. Our neighbors above us are chopping wood in their apartment and water comes from above into our apartment. They are bad neighbors. And my daughter is pregnant and may get sick. How can we live like this?" Lieutenant-Colonel M. Rudzinski promises to intervene, although it is difficult to do something in cases like this. We proceed to the State Machinery Center [POM].

After The First Day

The administration of the Lubicz Gmina (Torun Voivodship) recently was changed, and now it is headed by Major Zdzislaw Guminny. It is from here that all orders and announcements for the field inspectors originate. Around 2 p.m., the inspectors from the military and civilian groups begin to return

to the gmina office from their inspections in and around Lubicz. "We are all here," states Major Z. Gumieny, "so we can now give you an idea of the first day." Lieutenant Grzegorz Rogala begins.

The problem is to correct the organization in the office, which employs 29 people. Today there are 9 on sick leave. This situation will affect for a long time the work organization. Another negative factor is that 90 percent of the employees commute to Lubicz, which causes frequent tardiness. But somehow there is improvement in resolving citizen complaints.

The discussion turns to the issue of market production. In Jedwabno, an emigre Polish group took a PGR building and wanted to discuss the possibility of producing floor coverings and table ceramics, using the raw materials available in the gmina. This fact is noted as positive. On the other hand, the phenomenon that the office does not encourage pensioners and retirees to participate in service activities receives a negative evaluation. One can find only one service organization in the gmina--pressing. "The Torun workers' cooperatives employ many home-workers in the gmina. They do not have to register at the office."

A separate issue within the inspection activities was the inspection of trade institutions by sanitary-epidemiological inspectors and the State Supervision of Commerce. The sanitary conditions of inspected stores were considered good. Also regarded as positive in the gmina was agriculture, especially soil utilization and management of production means--much good has been done in this area.

Representatives of the Military Operating Group exchange more general reflections. The jungle of unclear regulations, which constrict freedom of decisionmaking at the local administrative level, cause violent opposition. For example, in the gmina cooperative, there are 460 tons of briquettes that are being destroyed by atmospheric causes. The solution is an immediate lowering of prices. The director declares that this problem could be solved within the next few hours, but everyone knows that the fire will probably go out as soon as he encounters the wall of regulations.

What Have They Counted On?

The SKR in Bobrowniki (Wloclawek Voivodship) was registered barely a week ago. Apparently as is the case with the entire reactivated gmina, the cooperative is found in the overall organization. However, this does not interfere in the maintenance of order. One can see care about cleanliness in stores, shops and walking areas. Machinery, although old for the most part, is repaired and preserved. Captain Henryk Komodzinski states that acid for batteries should be placed in glass jars and not in buckets. It is also proposed that shelves be built for necessary odds and ends. The group's chief finished his recommendations.

RSP Zbrachlin, Nieszawa Gmina. A few months ago, this was one of the most unkempt cooperatives. Today, members of the inspection group rub their eyes

in amazement. As a result of their neatness, there is more grain here than in the neighbors' fields. The director gave his word last September that he would put the farm "on its feet." It appears from everything that he has succeeded.

SKR Nieszawa with its headquarters in Zbrachlin. Order is here only in the eyes of the director. It is considerably worse in the remaining areas. "All recommendations by the administration of the cooperative are accepted by the staff as my whims, as attempts to limit their actions," accuses the director. "You are my last hope," he says to Major Jozef Brzezinski. The director is afraid that his further attempts to introduce discipline could lead to a situation where he has no people to work. There is already a shortage. RSP Wiktoryn, a farm in Niszczewe. A sad site. Disorder at every corner. In the field there are stacks of rotten stalks, which have been standing there for years. Piles of thrown-out bricks stand next to construction sites. Behind the walls are piles of tires. The state of the thread indicates that they are new. Why are they lying under the blue sky? In the pig-sty there is a large pig drowned in the manure. Whose is it? The questions go unanswered because the director of the farm is not present.

The Mechanized Services Plant Brudnowo. Last year this plant was judged positively. Today, the distributors at the gas station are illegal. The glass in both of them is broken out. There is a fire extinguisher, but it is not functioning. Seven destroyed trailers are at the site. One of them is partially disassembled, supported by a brace. It threatens the mechanic underneath it. The new tractor C-330 by the office has not been registered since July of last year. The windows are broken in the shop and storage magazine. Captain Stanislaw Wodzinski informs the director of the plant that he can obtain glass from SKR.

This is only the beginning of the inspections. It is already obvious, however, that not everyone accepted wholeheartedly the previous recommendations made by the Military Operating Groups. What have they counted on?

9807

CSO: 2600/851

PROVINCIAL PARTY ACTIVITIES NOTED

Biala Podlaska Province Executive Meeting

Luolin SZTANDAR LUDU in Polish 3 March 83 p 2

[Article by sw]

[Text] At its session yesterday, the Executive Board of the PZPR Provincial Committee in Biala Podlaska discussed the state and conditions of dissemination of culture in Biala Podlaska province to the year 1985.

Prior to that, however, the board members inspected the cultural center that is being established in the provincial city. This center includes the Provincial and City Public Library, the Provincial House of Culture, the District Museum, and various cultural and social organizations. The board members also familiarized themselves with the modernization and repairs that are being carried out and with the placement of the cultural institutions in the sites assigned to them.

During the discussion and reports on the dissemination of culture in the province, it was found that the most important thing is to eliminate the cultural disparity between city and countryside. The main task is to provide recreational facilities and to foster and popularize in rural areas such forms of cultural activity as are available in the city.

The Provincial Committee's Executive Board has a keen interest in fostering culture in Biala Podlaska province and in treating it on an equal footing with other spheres of sociopolitical activity. The board appreciated the efforts of the administrative authorities in behalf of the cultural center in Biala Podlaska and in behalf of cultural institutions engaged in developing various forms of dissemination. It recommended to the basic-level party echelons that they define at their membership meetings the tasks for the local cultural organizations for the 1983-1985 period. It asked the branches of PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth] to participate in creating a climate for fostering cultural activity and to explain the party's ideological positions to the public. The board considered it necessary above all, however, to devote more attention to cultural matters in rural areas.

The Provincial Committee's Executive Board also received information on the situation in the trade union movement, and was told about the preparations for the forthcoming session of the PZPR Provincial Committee.

Biala Podlaska Plenum Preparation

Lublin SZTANDAR LUDU in Polish 10 Mar 83 p 2

[Text] Yesterday (March 9), under the chairmanship of the first secretary of the PZPR Provincial Committee, Czeslaw Staszczak, the Provincial Committee's Executive Board met in Biala Podlaska. The topic of the session was the approval of materials for the Provincial Committee plenum to be held next Monday, 14 March. The topic of the plenum will be "Tasks of the Provincial Party Organization in the Struggle to Realize the Principles of Socialist Social Justice."

The preparations for the plenary session included an extensive discussion of materials in the provincial echelons and party organizations. The information being received indicates that the scheduled topics have aroused keen interest among the public. The Provincial Committee is receiving opinions and warnings about various injustices and deviations in our public life, particularly those resulting from alcoholism, violation of work discipline, speculation, and moral breakdown of the family. The primary reasons for this state of affairs, it is believed, are indifference toward manifestations of social pathology, insufficient education, and inefficiency on the part of law enforcement agencies and judicial organs.

The Executive Board accepted the proposed agenda of the plenary meeting. It was decided that in addition to the opening report, there would be 5 reports dealing with the following subjects: the effects of monitoring actions taken by local operational groups; financial crimes; the scope and effectiveness of activities of the MO [Civic Militia], the State Attorney's Office, and anti-speculation committees. A report from the Provincial Committee's Subcommittee for Letters, Complaints and Warnings from the public is expected as well.

During its session, the Executive Board also assessed the current socio-political and economic situation in the province, and discussed the draft of the plan for plenary sessions of the PZPR Provincial Committee for the remainder of the year.

Biala Podlaska Province Plenum

Lublin SZTANDAR LUDU in Polish 15 Mar 83 pp 1, 2

[Article by jst]

[Text] Yesterday, the PZPR Provincial Committee in Biala Podlaska held a plenary session. The topic of the meeting, which was attended by Mirowlaw Milewski,

member of the Politburo and secretary of the PZPR CC, was the tasks of the provincial party organization in the struggle to realize the principles of social justice. The meeting was conducted by the first secretary of the PZPR Provincial Committee, Czeslaw Staszczak. Those present were representatives from the administrative authorities of the province and from political parties, as well as the official directors of law enforcement agencies and judicial organs.

The Provincial Committee plenum was preceded by an extensive discussion in social organizations. Sixty POPs [basic party organizations] in workplaces also took part in this discussion, and the proposals that were made were included in the materials presented to the delegates. These materials consisted of the report of the Provincial Committee's Executive Board, presented by the first secretary of the PZPR Provincial Committee, and five additional reports presented by Col Kazimierz Chodelski, the KOK representative for Biala Podlaska Province; Jan Puzkarski, the provincial public prosecutor; Vice Governor Wieslaw Obszanski, chairman of the Provincial Committee for Combatting Speculation; Stanislaw Wasiluk, director of the treasury in Biala Podlaska; and Lt Col Adam Olesinski, chairman of the PZPR Provincial Committee's Subcommittee for Letters, Complaints and Warnings from the public.

The status of security and order in Biala Podlaska Province, stated the report of the Provincial Committee's Executive Board, is affected by developments in the political, social and economic situation throughout the country. Despite a number of new measures and actions, the crime rate in the province continues to rise. In 1982, a total of 3,293 crimes were recorded, i.e., 438 more than in 1981. Apart from violent crime, there was a particularly disturbing increase in the number of such economic crimes as larceny, wastefulness and mismanagement. They generally occur in the food industry, the building trades, transport, retail business, and the service sector. It is evident that the internal monitoring cells in certain enterprises have done a very poor job in this regard.

"Of all the problems and social ills," stated the first secretary of the Provincial Committee, "what upsets and incenses working people the most is the growign speculation and profiteering. In Biala Podlaska Province in 1982 there was a marked increase in speculation-related crime."

"According to the echelons and the social and party organizations we contacted before the plenum to ask for their assessment of the country's problems," said comrade Staszczak, "the greatest social, material and moral harm is caused by drunkenness and alcoholism. They are also the primary criminogenic factors. Liquor has become a form of bribery. It is therefore incumbent upon us to employ all available means and all social forces in the fight against alcoholism."

The report also stated that particular attention should be given to young people in order to protect them from social ills. The party cannot be alone in this endeavor; it must have the support of all educational organizations and the whole society.

The 6 reports (which we shall deal with separately) were the topic of a discussion lasting many hours. A number of questions were raised by the participants. "Is it not too late," one of them asked, "for us to discuss social justice when the public has been demanding examination of this issue for years?" Ways were considered to eliminate the manifestations of social pathology; it was hoped that successful results would be achieved not only through the increased activity of law enforcement agencies and judicial organs but also, and perhaps primarily, through the activity of POPs, social organizations and all honest people in the struggle against social evils. Crime has always been with us and will never be stamped out completely, but we must strive to lessen its extent and severity. Participants in the discussion mentioned cases of flagrant injustice and of a callous, bureaucratic approach on the part of various offices of the economic and political administration toward people's grievances. Much attention was devoted to the activity of social monitoring committees; it was said that their membership had to be verified. There was criticism of the previous system of distributing welfare funds, which had not always been given to the neediest people.

Alcoholism constituted a separate topic of discussion. In the jurisdiction of the Biala Podlaska ZOZ alone there are 800 alcoholics, yet the province has only 13 hospital beds essential for detoxification treatment. The participants criticized the excessive tolerance on the part of various local authorities who reveal a curious inability to take action against law-breakers in high positions. Mutual dependencies and local deals are blocking initiatives and hindering realization of the principles of social justice. It is time in Biala Podlaska Province to stop making proposals and get down to business; echolons and POPs must show more resourcefulness and determination in this struggle.

The following persons took part in the discussion: Stanislaw Boratynski, retiree from Miedzyrzecze Podlaskie; Jozef Misiejuk, mayor of the town and commune of Terespol; Lucjan Wietraszek, secretary of the POP in the Terespol Customs Office; Miroslaw Muszynski, secretary of the PZPR Municipal Committee in Biala Podlaska; Wieslaw Wrotskowski, chairman of the Anti-Alcoholism Social Committee; Leszek Latek, teacher from Janow Podlaski; Stanislaw Jarosz, first secretary of the PZPR KMG in Parczew; Erazm Wasilewski, chairman of the Provisional Provincial Council of PRON; Stanislaw Sepka, chairman of the WKKP; Jan Grytczuk, farmer from the commune Podedworze; and Jozef Perzyk, pensioner from Radzyn Podlaski.

Miroslaw Milewski, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee, expressed his view of the discussion and the planum materials. Answering the question of why the party is now bringing up the issue of social justice, the CC secretary said that in accordance with the wish of party members this issue had been incorporated in the resolution of

the Ninth Congress. After the congress, however, our main task was to answer the questions: Will Poland survive or not? Will there be a new trouble spot in Central Europe? Will there be a civil war in the country or not? Answers to these questions were more important. Now that we have succeeded in attaining a certain level of stability, and now that everything indicates that this stability will increase, the party is concentrating its efforts on social justice, one of the basic tenets of socialism. Today we can present these issues and appeal for public support, since the number of the party's allies has grown considerably. Proof of this is the party conferences and the development of new trade unions, which already have 1.7 million members. The situation has changed for the better, and many people are joining us. PRON is expanding and self-government bodies are developing. This indicates how many allies the party has. There will be more and more of them, stated comrade Milewski, provided we do not make a mistake and provided we do not get carried away by our successes.

The CC secretary devoted much attention to the activity of party members in the struggle against social ills. He asserted that it is the statutory obligation of party members to respond to injustices.

In the resolution that was passed, the Provincial Committee accepted the guidelines and proposals for resolving the basic problems connected with realization of the principles of social justice. The Provincial Committee also accepted a plan for its activities for the remainder of the year and appointed a new special subcommittee--the Health and Welfare Subcommittee.

Bialystok Province Plenum on Discipline

Bialystok GAZETA WSPOLCZESNA in Polish 4 Mar 83 p 1

[Article by pi]

[Text] Yesterday's plenary session of the PZPR Provincial Committee in Bialystok was held under the chairmanship of Mikolaj Kozak, secretary of the Provincial Committee. The echelon members drew up a precise program of activities for the provincial echelon during the second half of the term, i.e., after the Provincial Reports-Program Conference that met in Bialystok on 10 February of this year.

Before the plenum participants began discussing the program of activities presented to them, Tadeusz Mieczyslaw Doroszko, secretary of the Provincial Committee, delivered a report on the most important aspects of party work. He gave examples of activities that are helping to rebuild the public's confidence in the party, such as quick response to citizens' letters and complaints, making administration more efficient, etc. "The bitter truth must be told," stated comrade Doroszko: "in many offices a petitioner is constantly treated as an intruder. Workers who treat petitioners in a cold, perfunctory manner must be disciplined. The poor opinion of agencies must be changed, and the party should see to this." Secretary Doroszko announced the introduction of monthly analyses of complaints received by the Provincial Committee.

During the discussion of the above-mentioned program of activities for the provincial echelon, more than a dozen comrades expressed their views. One of them was Col Leon Siemionczyk, who emphasized the quickness and carefulness with which the program had been worked out. He called attention, however, to the lack of a mechanism for monitoring its implementation. In reply, Secretary Kozak stated that the Provincial Committee's Executive Board is responsible for carrying out the program of activities.

Yesterday's plenum of the Provincial Committee also devoted much attention to analysis of the proposals made during the February reports conference. It had to be determined by voting whether or not controversial proposals were to be submitted for implementation.

The members of the Provincial Committee also drew up a program for implementing the tasks arising from the recent joint plenum of the PZPR CC and Chief Committee of the ZSL [United Peasant Party]. The speech by Wlodzimierz Kolodziejuk, secretary of the Provincial Committee, contributed the most material to this topic. The primary idea in his speech was that we must be self-sufficient.

The plenum decided to increase considerably the membership of the Provincial Committee's Ideological Subcommittee, in view of the need to conduct intensive ideological activity in all professional and social circles.

Bialystok Province on Industrial Hygiene

Bialystok GAZETA WSPOLCZESNA in Polish 7 Mar 83 p 2

[Article by aw]

[Text] Assessment of the state of industrial safety and hygiene in Bialystok Province was the main topic of the final session of the Executive Board of the PZPR Provincial Committee in Bialystok. According to data submitted by the District Inspector of Labor, last year more than 4,000 work-related accidents were recorded in the province. This resulted in a loss of over 100,000 work days. This state of affairs was due to such factors as nonobservance of the industrial safety and hygiene regulations and instructions (or often a complete lack of them), improper organization of workplaces, and the poor condition of production facilities.

The inspection carried out last year by the Provincial Sanitary-Epidemiological Station revealed that a part of the labor force was still working in hazardous conditions. The worst situation is at the Hajnow Enterprise for Wood Distillation and at the Agromet agricultural machinery factory. However, the number of occupational illnesses in the province dropped from

147 in 1981 to 116 last year. In order to eliminate improper conditions, labor inspectors issued more than 6500 citations in 1982. This caused, among other things, the shutdown of 30 production facilities, the halting of more than 300 projects, and the transfer of 334 workers to other duties because of a lack of required job qualifications or because of poor health. At the same time 202 persons were fined, including 81 factory managers and assistant managers.

Commencing discussion of the above topic, the Provincial Committee's Executive Board recommended that work conditions be inspected and evaluated this spring (it is suggested that this problem be taken up not only by the POPs but also by the newly forming trade unions). In the near future, close supervision will be undertaken of workplaces in which there is substantial danger of injuries and in which there are unhealthful work conditions. Much attention was given to the topic of instruction in industrial safety and hygiene as a means of enhancing professional skills.

Attention was called also to the problem of providing safe conditions for partially disabled people, i.e., the preparation of protected workplaces. It was determined, too, that there is an urgent need for preventive actions in the area of enforcement of industrial safety and hygiene regulations among individual farmers.

During the session, the Executive Board examined information on the letters and complaints sent in 1982 to the provincial, town and communal party echelons. During this period, the committees saw 7,569 petitioners and received over 1,500 letters and complaints from the public that concerned such current issues as the housing situation, interpersonal relationships, and the problems of agriculture.

The Provincial Committee's Executive Board pointed to the need for further, consistent implementation of the resolutions of the Central Committee's plenary sessions on this matter (i.e., treating warnings and complaints from the public as an important aspect of party work), and emphasized that it is necessary to give them careful consideration and, if possible, to take action on them.

In addition, the Executive Board examined information on the extent to which the program of ideological education in the provincial party organization had been implemented.

Bydgoszcz Province on Health Investments

Bydgoszcz GAZETA PODMORSKA in Polish 5-6 Mar 83 p 2

[Article by bur]

[Text] Yesterday the Executive Board of the PZPR Provincial Committee met in Bydgoszcz. The topics of the meeting were: evaluation of investments in the public health service in 1982 and the tasks for 1983;

information on the activity of the TPPR [Society for Polish-Soviet Friendship] in Bydgoszcz Province; and information on the social and economic situation in Bydgoszcz agricultural producer cooperatives.

Last year, 615 million zlotys was allocated for investments in the public health service and the social welfare service. This sum was earmarked for: construction of hospitals in Bydgoszcz and Inowroclaw; completion of construction of the medical school complex in Bydgoszcz, of a nursery in Tuchola, and of a water-supply system and artesian well at the hospital in Mogilno; construction of a psychiatric facility in Swiecie and of a cobalt bomb bunker at the Thirtieth Anniversary Hospital in Bydgoszcz; procuring medical supplies and equipment for public health centers. None of the investment tasks, the Executive Board ascertained, had been implemented completely. This was often due to shortages of building materials, but also to poor organization of work and to the failure of Budopol [Enterprise for Construction of Public Utility Facilities], the organization charged with executing the tasks, to utilize all reserves.

Of the 615 million zlotys earmarked for investment in the public health service, only 540.9 million was used last year. The longest delays occurred in the construction of hospitals in Inowroclaw and Bydgoszcz. The provincial governor allocated the unused sum for purchase of medical supplies and equipment and for acquisition of the technical facilities of the "Wschol" BKD at Szwederow in Bydgoszcz and of the Budopol facilities on Swarzewska street in Bydgoszcz for use by the public health service.

NFOZ [National Health Protection Fund] monies are being used to construct an oncological hospital in Bydgoszcz and 7 health centers, 3 nurseries and 2 outpatient clinics, also in Bydgoszcz province. For these purposes 63 million zlotys was spent in 1982, and nurseries with 75 places each have opened in Szubin and Chojnice. It is disturbing to find that the NFOZ is receiving less revenue, particularly from workplaces, since this limits the amount of money for investment in the public health service. For the oncological hospital alone, an expenditure of 90 million zlotys from the NFOZ is planned this year.

The largest sums from the local budget are being earmarked this year for continued construction of hospitals in Inowroclaw (scheduled to be completed in 1985) and in Bydgoszcz (scheduled to be completed in 1984), since this represents 456 million of the 580 million zlotys allocated for investment in the public health service. The Budopol management has assured the Provincial Committee's Executive Board that all the tasks will be completed in time this year.

Next, the Provincial Committee's Executive Board was informed of the activity of the TPPR in Bydgoszcz province. The events of 1980-1982 hampered the work of the Society for Polish-Soviet Friendship; consequently, its most important task now is to rebuild its cells and collectives and to resume their activity. The TPPR implements its program mainly through various kinds of cultural activity. The TPPR attempts to increase the

public's knowledge of the USSR and counteracts anti-Soviet feeling by clarifying controversial issues and by combatting myths and falsehoods. In Bydgoszcz Province, the society has nearly 33,000 members in workplaces and institutions, and 29,000 in schools.

The Provincial Committee's Executive Board expressed its appreciation and gratitude to all the TPPR activists and members, who in a difficult period put much effort into the struggle to strengthen Polish-Soviet Friendship.

The next item on the Executive Board's agenda concerned the state of agriculture and the social situation in Bydgoszcz RSPs [agricultural producer cooperatives]. There are 71 of them in Bydgoszcz Province, with a total area of 34,600 hectares. Constituting 5.4 percent of the province's cultivated area, they supply 6.9 percent of the grain production, 5.7 percent of the livestock, 4.5 percent of the milk and 28.5 percent of the eggs. This output is being lowered by the new cooperatives (those established after 1975), of which there are 24 in Bydgoszcz Province.

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CSO: 2600/602

IVICA RACAN DISCUSSES PARTY WEAKNESSES

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 19 Apr 83 pp 9-13

[Excerpts from an interview with Ivica Racan, director of the Josip Broz Tito Political School and a member of the Central Committee of the LCY, by Jelena Lovric and Mladen Maloca: "The Party Is Not to Blame for Everything"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Ivica Racan, the current director of the Josip Broz Tito Political School in Kumrovac and a member of the Central Committee of the LCY, has been involved with ideology in the party for many years, either directly or in connection with other duties. He spoke with us recently, drawing from this accumulated experience, in a very critical manner about the way things are on our ideological front. And this was one of the reasons for having this conversation (a quite voluminous one which was carried out over two sessions), from which we are publishing unauthorized excerpts. We shall begin with the question: What are the social conditions out of which this dissatisfying ideological tendency has grown, according to the evaluations which have been carried out?

[Answer] There is much agreement in the basic and overall description of the current social situation. However, it becomes more complicated and there is less agreement when one must say from where have come the difficulties and the economic crises, which, by their very existence, are social to a certain extent. There is still less agreement as to what should be done to make the problems easier to solve and to take the next step forward in the construction of a socialistic, self-managed society.

From where does this lack of agreement over what is so important come? Beneath the general agreement concerning the overall direction--to continue with the course of socialist self-management construction--there are a multitude of questions and dilemmas. Among them: why are social contradictions intensifying and what is their nature; why has the progress toward self-management become stagnated?

It seems to me that we have not properly perceived some objective societal contradictions; we have overlooked and underestimated problems and obstacles which must be surmounted in order to take the next step on the road to

self-management. Our revolution is continually accompanied by two dangers; we are constantly, as Kardelj said once long ago, in a struggle on two fronts. One front involves movement toward bourgeois restoration; on the other front, the establishment of etatist and bureaucratic socialism is being offered to us as something beneficial. These dangers--and the current situation bears this out--will accompany our revolution for a long time to come, because the struggle over controlling social reproduction is also an extraordinarily long-term matter. We are making a mistake when we place such a goal in the near future, even when we include it in priority working documents.

Responsible Behavior

We have also not studied adequately what sort of demands such a necessary new step in the development of a socialist, self-managed society places before the subjective forces. Indeed, at the 10th LCY Congress we said quite clearly that there can be neither automatism nor determinism in the development of socialism, but that development depends on the struggle of the subjective forces. But we were not precise in saying in what way the subjective forces should operate, what kind of subjective forces these should be, and what the stages are that we have to go through to accomplish this long-term goal. Specifically, when we took that very important [first] step in the removal of the previous monopoly of the etatist, bureaucratic structure in the Yugoslav federal plan in the management of income and accumulation, we did not take the other step, for decisionmaking truly to pass into the hands of the producers. Instead it has stopped in some other hands, the etatist monopoly remained, but now it is at the republic, province and opstina level, and even in organizations of associated labor.

[Question] Long ago, Tito warned of the joining together of the technobureaucracy and the political structures.

[Answer] And today this is quite real, only some motifs have been changed. Etatism is everywhere around us, it does not exist only in the federal plan, and somewhere here a definite lag in the development of self-management relations has originated. It is one of the dominant reasons for economic instability and crisis. Not only economic occurrences are based on this, but ideological and moral crises, as well as confusion in society; all of this together paves the way for all sorts of critics and advocates of various ideological conceptions to offer their perceptions and receipts for getting out of this situation. Moreover, these critics do not see nor is it sufficiently perceived in the ranks of the LCY, that expanded reproduction is still not always in the hands of associated producers to the degree necessary or possible. Often, various etatist interests break through the designated structures in the political system, even into the LCY; there is mutual conflict of interests, and because of resistance in the party, its ability to mobilize its membership effectively is greatly reduced, as well as its ability elsewhere.

This description would not be close to being complete or accurate if we did not say that hand in hand with these tendencies there is a little of modified etatism. Its other side includes tendencies toward preemption of group, or private ownership of income--in addition to the same disposition and striving toward managing accumulation and expanded reproduction by bureaucratic means--which also threatens self-management. That is why we must study the real capabilities of subjective forces at the same time we are analyzing production relations. One cannot speak of the slow-down in the self-management process and of economic crisis without also seeing that some crisis elements also exist in the essence of subjective forces, which are turning more and more to the existing centers of power and decisionmaking and less and less to what we have proclaimed as the political delegate system. I don't think this is only in the LCY. All of these various tendencies which I am talking about find support in the subjective forces, even in the LCY; from within this organization they act to incapacitate it as an ideological and political leader and as a mobilizer in the construction of socialistic self-management.

[Question] We have proceeded to describe the social situation in broad enough terms, but does it seem that the significant problem is just in the LCY?

[Answer] I would not agree that the LCY is the dominant, or even the only one, focus of guilt for the problems with which we are confronted.

Because the party has at least been able to articulate the problems of this stage. It has not been very successful in some other stages. It was neither organized nor directed in such a way as to accomplish the tasks which it placed before itself, and then placed before society. We cannot proceed any further if we become reconciled to a situation in which responsible behavior does not take place in every part of the party. In the past, inactivity could still be concealed on the collective scale by the activity of the forum. However, this is quite inappropriate to the type of relations we would like to build; it is incompatible with them.

Unacceptable Extremes

A tendency exists in the LCY which we have not been able to eliminate--it even seems to me that it is spreading in an elemental way--which has brought to the party some negative things along with it, and which is growing stronger. It is forum activity, and I would also say it is the imitation of collective labor and collective mobilization. Is there not a certain element to which we have succumbed, in economic matters, which is a pragmatic wrestling with economic difficulties; is not this daily struggle with economic problems also one of the things which strengthens the role and significance of the administrative and executive organs, the etatist and bureaucratic, and even technocratic structures in work organizations, and all to the detriment of the broader mobilization of social forces? Does not the party bear the consequence of this pragmatism? Its demand is that which instantaneously helps it, which gets it out of difficulties--that is, a few technocrats, a few bureaucrats, and my God, such is life.

[Question] How much of this type of awareness has penetrated into the LCY and into its leadership?

[Answer] In spite of all our proclamations, wrestling with the misfortunes which beset us is not a very stimulating way to get a broad mobilization, and it might be a limiting factor if we do not dive deeper into our ranks in order to see what it is that is in them which works against a better utilization of socialist forces. The LCY is on the agenda--it must also be the subject of critical study. As we critically analyze the various ideological tendencies which are now appearing, and even the strengthening of certain antisocialistic and hostile tendencies in general, we must also analyze everything which stimulates them in the same way. We must be especially critical of ourselves and our ability to confront the problems which face us and to solve them with our own dedication, not in any which way, but by taking a new step in the strategic direction of implementing social self-management.

It seems to me that the party can be seen from two extremes at this point in time. One extreme says that the LCY is to blame for everything. Obviously, one will find some culprits among the 2 million party members, but it is unacceptable that their mistakes are carried over to the entire party, and that many of the objective problems in the development of society should fall on the back of the subjective responsibility of the LCY. The other extreme, which is equally unacceptable to me just because of these objective problems in the new stage of social development, pardons both the obvious weaknesses and the disintegration of the avant-garde movement which is so necessary to us. Both of these extremes are mutually stimulating in some way. Together with the struggle for extricating ourselves from our economic difficulties--but by strengthening self-management, and not by restraining it--we must analyze party organization and its defects. Recently, we have not taken into account all that has been brought into the LCY and which is destroying it from within. For this job, our alibi cannot be this frontal assault of antisocialist and antiself-management forces on the LCY.

[Question] This means that the crisis is not one of our ideological plan and vision of the development of self-management, but of the realization of that policy. Here, then, appear theses on the ability or lack of ability of the LCY, theses which are becoming more and more frequent, and which have culminated in the appraisals that the LCY, where it is today, has exhausted its historic role.

[Answer] The LCY has by no means exhausted its historic mission. We have never maintained that the LCY is an eternal concept, but that phase of socialist development in which it will not be necessary is still far in the future. I would not agree that the LCY as it is now has played out its role. This means that we would need something else, and we know that demands for the liquidation of the party are based on precisely this particular. The question is what sort of party is being conceived of and what would take its place. The matter simply concerns the need for the subjective forces to change pace--there is no possibility for calling a

timeout, the problem will not wait for us. We must take advantage of the opportunity, because the moment of crisis is also a challenge for the subjective forces to be mobilized and to form again into a new quality appropriate to the time in which we find ourselves now, and before which we will find ourselves. The stress must be on the activity of the populace, and the avant-garde will be avant-garde in function only to the extent that this populace is successfully mobilized.

Turn to the Worker

The creation of an LCY which is more suitable to the present time is hindered by a number of problems. The first is the state of internal relations in the party; how much the consciousness--that every member of the party and every one of its parts and organizations is responsible for its policies and vice versa--has actually been constructed and affirmed, that the party in its entirety corresponds to the behavior of the individual and each of its parts. The second is whether our positions and conclusions are actually the result of manysided discussion or of a parody of discussion, which usually has as a consequence a basic position which is able to conceal many different ideological currents which have been adopted by individual parts of the party, and which everyone can then show when such a position must be demonstrated. The third is concerned with the critical analysis and discussion which takes place in the LCY, with the dialogue dealing with the objective differences in positions and interests. All of the tendencies which I have spoken of are also working against the LCY. One need not close one's eyes to them, but through discussion attempt to construct a unified position which will then tie together the entire membership. The suppression of some problems, or putting them on the agenda in an inadequate, abstract, or formal manner, will advance neither communism, nor anything else. We cannot proceed any further in this manner. The LCY must turn to the worker to a greater extent, but not with pronouncements, it must live with him, and rely a little less on the existing centers of decisionmaking.

[Question] A politician said recently that working people feel more and more like extras on a stage in which only a few individuals play prominent roles. It is no coincidence that they resort more and more to the forum process. Back at the Fifth Antifascist Council, Tito said that we must go among the workers. There is very little of this. I can't remember when any of our leaders went out to a factory and appeared before several hundred or thousand workers.

[Answer] We converse with the people only through the news, interviews, statements, an occasional visit to lower forums...

[Question] ...where you move in a narrow circle of those who think like you, for the most part. One gets the impression that there are not enough people in the party who are ready and able to speak about all the problems and difficulties which are before us in an open and critical manner, with clear and firm arguments, understandably and knowledgeably.

[Answer] There is a great deal of creative power in the LCY which we simply have not known how to set in motion, we have not been able to extract from these people what we know they can objectively give. Even though popularization quite suddenly brought great problems to the party, nevertheless, we have in the 2 million or so members an extraordinary ideological and political potential which we dare not underestimate.

[Question] But you have spoken about a certain amount of increased opportunism in the LCY.

[Answer] There are many problems here. We say, why don't we discuss them in meetings, in forums, at places where decisions are made. We have not learned how to come face to face with different positions in a democratic manner, and to try to come together, presenting one argument after another. Why should we report in public debates and in public justifications of a position, when it is easier to influence, through certain channels, those in whose hands the decisionmaking power is concentrated? If the LCY does not demonstrate a greater willingness to come face to face with different positions through debates and the democratic process, it will lose its leading ideological and political position. There is now in the party a very pronounced need to preserve unity, even at the expense of not discussing some problem in general, because in this way our differences are not apparent, we do not expose ourselves to the risk of perhaps not having authority.

The Boomerang of the Public

Something which is compromising, statist and bureaucratic has crept into our system. We must talk about it more openly and attempt to change things, but not only with the demand that others do the work. While the LCY is silent about some problems, it will discuss them outside the party which is to the detriment of its ideological and political capabilities. While we do not subject the methods of political work very well to the familiar truth that not only Marxists exist in this society, and that even among them there are important differences, we will be driven on the horse-drawn cart of forum activity, in the wagon of verbal appeal for different practices, and nothing will be changed except that the boomerang will be returned to us from the public--and to whom do you tell this? When we ourselves speak critically about how we should be working, this question comes back from the public: So, why don't you do it that way? Because we all still think that someone else should be the first to do it, we all still think that someone else does things worse than we do. The absurd situation is that, let us say, the work of one forum is evaluated as being good although the organizations which the forum represents were rated as poor. This is the typical bureaucratic-forum, self-satisfied estimation of its own work and position.

[Question] The LCY and the intelligentsia? Recently, much misunderstanding seems to have broken out on this project.

[Answer] I would not agree that any anti-intellectualism is increasing in the LCY. Nor would I be able to agree with the evaluation that the creative intelligentsia is outside of the party, that it is opposed to it. These are simplifications which correspond to certain antisocialist groups which are attempting to make their own intellectualistic position predominate in a messianic manner, depriving someone else of their intellectual character with whom they are at ideological and political variance. However, it is true that the LCY has not fully utilized its abstract, theoretical and intellectual potential. There is still the very strong feeling that complex ideological problems which require analysis, discussion, dialogue, and multilateral consideration from different angles can be solved by political decree, qualification, political evaluation and in one or two sentences.

It is not only that this is no longer possible, of course, but that the LCY for the most part keeps bearing the ideological and political responsibility. In order to set in motion the existing potential in the LCY, and more extensively, in society, one must provide the opportunity of being present in everything which is in the blueprint for socialist and self-management construction. Making room for discussion and dialogue means at the same time rejecting the simple solution of passing the buck to the LCY. It is often attacked from the outside as being an undemocratic organization by precisely those people who demand more democracy and dialogue only to the extent that their interests are served.

[Question] This is demonstrated by a whole series of "incidents," from Cosic to Draskovic...

[Answer] Exactly. And the problem is not so much in these incidents as they are simply a test at a given moment for our real relationship to certain problems. It depresses me that some miserable little problem has served as a litmus test in which the existing differences or incapacibilities in the LCY are presented, but sometimes it is simpler in the case of marginalia to express our position, as well as our mutual differences, than it is in the case of some more serious problem, at least according to official views. Moreover, I am talking about incidents which in and of themselves do not merit a great deal of attention, but the relationship to them expresses certain ideological tendencies with which the LCY would not dare be reconciled. Whether a certain concept expresses more or less nationalist tendencies is not terribly essential, but it is of consequence whether on this occasion the ideological and political capability and maturity of the party to come face to face with nationalism, regardless of whether it is part of the concept or a secondary issue, is demonstrated. And the two are often confused.

Room for Criticism

The LCY must demonstrate by example, as a part of this ideological and intellectual plan, that it is prepared to enter into public problems at the proper time, and not wait until the problems escalate to the point where it is forced into discussion, and then, of course, put on the defensive.

There are some matters in our ideological way of life which must be the subject of critical discussions, Marxist analysis, and there are those for which it is more appropriate to use political means, even direct political intervention. It is not possible to react to everything in the same way.

[Question] Some very critical evaluations have been made recently about our Marxist criticism.

[Answer] When we speak of the ideological front, so-called ideological, or Marxist criticism is a most critical component for us. Why it is weak, for what reason does it become infrequent or absent altogether, by what means does it objectively feed the mill of political arbitration, political intervention, even evaluate forums--these are important questions. Usually we wander in a circle on the trail of the idea that Marxist criticism is missing because of the intervention of the political forum. But putting things in this way leads us nowhere except into an impasse. A certain conformism of a bourgeois nature which is right in line with bureaucratic consciousness is being ascribed to us on different sides among the ranks--why should I become occupied with something if someone else can do it, why should I be pulled out of my bourgeois tranquility, why should I be exposed? If we find this type of behavior in the LCY, and in its leadership, then it is also prevalent in other areas of labor and ways of life.

To accuse the LCY as a whole--and it has weaknesses--from certain intellectual centers because of a lack of timely and open dialogue, and to do nothing oneself in one's own environment to straighten out the practice of polemical and democratic discussion, is to be engaged in mere parlor talk. If we are talking about the absolutely essential critical analyses of the capability of the LCY, we will have to say who has the right to be the most critical of the situation in the LCY. It seems to me that we will have to talk about a certain effective legitimacy of this criticism. Otherwise, the opportunism which has crept into the LCY, i.e., rejecting him who expressed the criticism (because of his conformist position), will also throw out the problem about which we must speak. In this way, opportunism in the LCY and unacceptable criticism of the party as a whole are mutually stimulated and the party is blamed for all the sins of society, even those for which the LCY or one of its sectors cannot possibly be guilty.

[Question] When we speak of Marxist criticism, it is apparent that there cannot be eight of these critiques; if it is Marxist criticism, perhaps there can be only one. And it has been observed that it might be possible to create a topography of political discourse, by using texts it would be easy to begin to determine from which environment the criticism comes, which interests are represented.

[Answer] I do not know exactly how such a topography might be created, but I do know that the tendency of federalism has forced its way into the LCY--that is correct. We have not begun to wrestle effectively in a simple manner with attempts to take possession of certain forums of the LCY and

their representatives in the higher organs from the etatist structures of the republics and the provinces, and even those lower, by imperative mandate. The increased critical awareness about how dangerous the personal joining of the technobureaucracy with political structures is for the LCY will increase the critical distance of the party from these centers and structures. And in the federative plan there is polemic discussion about public questions. I do not see why a certain critical intonation should not return to the republic, province and opstina leadership from these discussions, as a corrective for their position and behavior. It is simply a matter of democratic centralism.

[Question] It must be admitted that during the last year much has been said about responsibility, but when one looks at the concrete results of this continual invitation and appeal for responsibility, he sees that they are very meager. And so we again confront lack of responsibility, more erosion, loss of clear, ethical criteria, which once were characteristic of communists.

[Answer] There is a feeling present in the social atmosphere as a whole, and in the broad masses of working people and citizens, that the efforts to get us out of the existing difficulties are insufficient and inconsistent. It is normal in this type of situation to scrutinize us ever more closely, to intensify the demand for responsibility; it is normal to seek more than before. It is normal that behavior which has been acceptable up to now is being reappraised, and it is good and logical that critical social awareness, and social criticism in general, are being sharpened. It is difficult to be able to express the existing, healthy criticism regarding social currents, subjective weaknesses and lack of responsibility through what we now have in the way of political forces, because they function for the most part as forums.

We Must Come to an Agreement

How to perceive, and not lose sight, of this criticism which exists in the working class, criticism which is not negative, which always depends on faith in the subjective forces of this country, how to stimulate it, I emphasize, stimulate, how to help it be expressed and not to have it be manipulated by criticism which comes from antisocialist and antiself-management positions? If the subjective forces do not make room for this creative criticism, we will continue to be confused in trying to deal with criticism which we must reject because it comes from unacceptable positions at the same time we are dealing with the criticism which comes from the general public which is healthy and necessary, and with the critical expectations, and even the dissatisfactions, of the working class. If in throwing out the dirty water of opposition criticism we also throw out the child, we might have to continue to survive on the inertia of futile meetings, resolutions and the parody of effective, collective work.

[Question] Isn't the LCY somewhat late in this entire action? Is it possible to restore it so that it can again function as a true creator and ideological leader instead of as a fireman?

[Answer] We have been somewhat late; for various reasons, mostly because of individual opportunism, we have been late in placing definite topics on the agenda, and when we discussed them, we did not treat them adequately. But I do not think that we will be late for this train in the end; we must not allow this to happen. It might happen if we continue with the current weaknesses. For some reason, we now forget the valuable experience that we have been strongest when we have proceeded openly, when in difficult situations we have put the correct state of things before our people. This was an expression of faith, and it was understood as such, and it became the greatest contributing factor to the mobilization of people in creatively overcoming dangers and problems. Secondly, we must make it possible to discuss all problems--they don't have to be in public right away--but these must be discussions which have heads and tails. We often have a somewhat absurd situation now--the forum makes some general resolutions or gets sterile information from its meetings, and individuals from the forum have concrete positions. This does not contribute to collective labor, but it is the best way to disavow the ideology of Tito.

I hope that this is not intentional in most cases. Third, we must be responsive to the entire Yugoslav community at all times. Because, disregarding the monetary interests of all of us, we must be conscious of the fact that cooperation is the fateful question for all of us in Yugoslavia.

Moreover, we must come to agreement with one another, and this means we must be clear and precise and open to the arguments of others in presenting our interests and positions. And we must stop bidding--who has more, and who has less to give, and even which nationality is less and which is more dangerous. This is absurd. We forget that every nationalistic tendency, whether it be on the offensive or defensive, whether it strive to close one nation off into itself or to have one nation dominate others, directly violates from within, and dangerously threatens, the cooperative efforts of Yugoslav citizens. We dare not forget that certain anti-socialistic and antiself-management conceptions and attitudes have penetrated into the LCY, and our job does not end with this or that kind of persuasive, polemical, ideological accounting of our foreign conceptions. The assumption of an ideological and political offensive of the LCY is the flaring up of the daily political and ideological work and discussion. Otherwise, we do not know how to be more on the offensive. To be more on the offensive, and to be reconciled to the weaknesses which have accumulated in the LCY, and of which we are conscious, means to stick to the verbal, to the idiomatic. Today this is no longer enough.

9548

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CONTROVERSY OVER POEMS BY SIMOVIC REVIEWED

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1686, 24 Apr 83
pp 35-36

[Text] It would be good if it were not bad (as usual): the most recent issue of KNJIZEVNE NOVINE sold out in record time. Everyone knows that the reason for this is the small-sized collection of poems "Istocnice" [Sources] by Ljubomir Simovic, but the interest in it does not include any sort of sudden love for poetry. After all, were that the case, the decision of the editors of KNJIZEVNE NOVINE to print Simovic's verses as an entire issue of the newspaper would not have been motivated by the fact that the printings of works by domestic writers are mainly small and that it will be increased in this way by 7,000 copies.

And the book "Istocnice" was supposed to come out one of these days in a publication by the literary magazine in Nis GRADINA, again as a separate issue. It will not be appearing: as the daily press reported early this week, the editors of that magazine called upon Simovic to omit several verses from the collection which could have been given an adverse political interpretation, but the poet refused, and the type of "Istocnice" was broken up.

Thanks to KNJIZEVNE NOVINE the poems have nevertheless reached the public, and the first political comments on certain of their themes have caused a hum and joy in the marketplace, which is already murmuring about a new "Djogo case."

It is indeed fortunate that this hope will soon prove groundless. There is some basis for hoping that we are all more intelligent after "Woolen Times," at least in that we now know the true sequence of moves. In other words, "Istocnice" provides a good occasion for gaining confidence once again in our literary criticism, to which the future discussion of Simovic's most recent poetry (along with "Istocnice," there are also the collections "Um za morem" [The Mind by Sea] and "Deset obracanja" [Ten Revolutions]) belongs by the very nature of things and before anyone else.

The absence of real literary analysis, as we know, makes any subsequent offering of "expert evaluation" out of place, especially when "expert evaluations" of another kind, as a rule extremely unsuitable when a work of art is in question, have already been made. The choice has to be made between creative freedom (and accordingly the freedom of criticism) and the Committee for

Protection of Creative Freedoms. This becomes all the more important when we know that Ljubomir Simovic is not a babbler by any means or a showoff, nor is he a man inclined to excess of any sort, but the leading representative of a generation of poets, whose books and plays have had studies written about them, and they have received public awards and praise. Simovic himself mentioned on one occasion that for him "poetry is much more than literature; it is either a way of life and an outlook on life or nothing. For the poet all questions are posed and settled in the poem or nowhere." "Istocnice" is appearing at a moment of the full creative maturity of this kind of poet, and the level of maturity, Simovic says, must be proven and surpassed with each new book.

If that is the case, and there is no doubt that it is, then that recently popular thesis that a true work of art cannot serve anything but progress, that is, that poetry can never be on the side of glorification of evil, would also have to apply to Simovic. It follows that certain of Simovic's verses--those, say, about the darkness which is making it harder to breathe--can be viewed as the poet's sincere experience of reality which has been lived through, whose pessimistic tones are by no means an occasion for easy dismissal. Simovic attempts to evoke his vision of the bad state of the world (stated in layman's terms) in a neoromantic spirit, and in "Istocnice" there are several poems in a pastoral key that is out of the ordinary in our time.

But the trouble with this romanticism in a new key is that it usually, even when it is authentic, occurs where some of the pots have been mixed up. The problem is not that Simovic derives the bad state of the world from his feeling of Serbia being threatened, nor perhaps in the fact that he wants to "read" the present through the past, faithful once again to his attitude that his most recent poetry is not a "poetizing of history and mythology, but a writing of poetry about our destinies today with the help of history and mythology." However, if "myths change," if "the distance from which they emit their messages changes,... the signs which they send us, and the means whereby they express themselves"--always remaining turned toward everyday life as an emanation of their significance--then Simovic's most recent poetry truly represents a kind of change whose purpose is to make the past a charge against the present. Everything from that past is thereby relativized to a limit that cannot always be tolerated.

For example, in the poem with the lengthy and indicative title "On the 38th Anniversary of the Battle Between the Partizans and Chetniks on Jelova Gora in September 1944," Simovic writes "Throughout these forests and meadows,/ in the ravines and ditches,/ no one knows how many thousands and thousands of fallen there are. But it is well known that none/ not a single one of them covered by the grass did not fall at the hand of his godfather, father, son/ or brother."

The elementary school analysis of these lines frames the conclusion that the poet is opposed to the fratricidal destiny of our history, that he is against all and every slaughter. But if the conflict between the Partizans and the Chetniks on Jelova Gora or anywhere else is reduced to the denominator of a slaughter within the family, then history is transformed into a dusty

criminalistic chronicle which does not deserve our attention, which should be forgotten. It was not, then, the Chetniks who committed the slaughter, but fathers and brothers, and there must be a time when they can and must be forgiven.

A serious man like Simovic does not harbor a false hope that this will happen as in some kind of patriotic novel. His pessimism originates precisely from the fact that he deeply believes that we have not taken a step out of hell in the 38 years since the battle on Jelova Gora. After all, in the "Poem About the Carrying of the Severed Head of Dusan Radovic, Known as the Condor, Through the Villages and Over the Mountains of Western Serbia," which was inspired by a showdown between Chetniks at the beginning of September 1944, when Filip Ajdacic, commanding officer of the Chetnik Montenegrin Brigade, Pozega Corps, killed the aforementioned Radovic, who was the organizer of the espionage and terrorism network of Draza Mihajlovic, out of personal motives, Ljubomir Simovic literally says "that we have not taken a step from hell/ if the rifleman is shot, if the butcher is slaughtered."

This has to mean that supposedly we would be living in paradise if the butchers were rewarded in a more appropriate way and if slaughter were treated as some kind of activity in the small business sector, but one should not exaggerate even with humor, especially when it is grizzly like this. All one can say is that there are still quite a few of those who do not want anything whatsoever to do with Simovic's hell, and, then, of those who 38 years after the battle on Jelova Gora do not turn even a hair because of the death of some Condor who was neither their brother, nor their father, nor their godfather, nor was he a Serb at all in the way that made the name of that people known in the world and among all people.

All the rest, as we have said, is a matter for literary analysis. While awaiting with interest what the critics will say, we are left only to wonder what really is happening to us when serious and talented people for no apparent reason, overnight, people esteemed and cherished, even people who are very active in what is referred to as civic work, put simply--people like Ljubomir Simovic, cross the Rubicon of sense and find themselves in the dark where we do believe it is hard for them to breathe. Or perhaps the datum that a month ago Simovic was "deleted from the records of the LCY" is a condition for his name to be entered in some other records. Then so be it. It is time for us to part.

7045
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JOURNALISTS SPEAK OUT AT PROFESSIONAL GATHERINGS

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1686, 24 Apr 83
pp 12-15

[Article by Milan Milosevic]

[Text] Are there pressures on the press, are journalists committed, what has been happening to our community, an expression which has almost imperceptibly displaced the slogan of brotherhood and unity, are there differing views within the journalistic profession? Are some news items (the matches from Osijek, for example) trumped up to serve far-reaching and dangerous ends? Who is now my editor in chief?--these provocative and difficult questions were put last week by journalists who happened all of a sudden to find themselves suddenly at the rostrum at several places.

Three events in the "newsman's life" again aroused a public already supersaturated with "issues concerning journalism": a controversial assembly of Serbian newsmen was held in Sokobanja, which a few days later was registered as an "attempt of a group to offer resistance to the policy of our self-managing society in the information field." Josip Vrhovec expressed the judgment that the affair with the matches bearing the letter "U" had been intentionally trumped up. And finally, in Belgrade the aktiv of communist newsmen on Tuesday discussed the contribution of the media to the development of interethnic relations and relations within the Federation.

It would be possible to draw a "representative sample" from those three situations not only of what journalists are thinking, but also perhaps of the average social consciousness.

Let us look at this series of monologues. First: the aktiv.

Yugoslavia or a Federation? (With No Unitaristic Overtone)

This apparently "academic" gathering (at one point Dragan Nikitovic asked: "Is anyone going to speak?") mentioned a number of strategic topics which are outstanding in our political life.

"The opportunistic evasion of unpleasant truths, the malady is too broad and deep for its cure to be expected exclusively from the media," Milutin

Milenkovic (Radio Belgrade) concluded at the outset, pointing out that it is impossible to get around the fact that the complicated federal bodies and leadership structures are not managing in the present constellation of interests and in the balance of power to understand one another and reach agreement even concerning such delicate and important dilemmas in development of the Yugoslav Federation as, for example, the realization (nonrealization) of the constitutional status of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, which ought not to be a state any the less or any the more than the other republics in the SFRY.

He also mentioned in the same context the "refusal to seek clearer and more suitable answers to the question of how much Yugoslavia, which is more and more frequently referred to only as the Federation, is still a federal state, as is emphasized in our constitutions, or has it already become an alliance of states with separate political economies, political structures, and so on?"

Similar questions were put by Ivo Druzijanic (Zagreb correspondent of TV Belgrade): "We really should discuss," Druzijanic said, "about how to destroy those divisions, those fences, how to prevent room from opening up for the euphoria, for the enemy, how to simply prevent that ideological position which has nationalism at its core. The media could do a great deal to help if they had the same criteria both where they are published and where they are sold."

Druzijanic spoke critically about the monitoring of the news.

"A few years ago a working paper appeared as the basis for public discussion of the situation and tasks in the news media. One of the things said in that working paper is that one can write critically about another community with the political consent of the leadership of that community. Now I ask you, that is a working paper which came out in the name of a commission of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee! This was before the events in Kosovo, but all of us newsmen who rose up to object to that working paper were immediately proclaimed to be unitarists. What happened then? The working paper got lost, it disappeared, and the authors of that working paper remained in their positions or got new positions, either political posts or posts in the media.

"In Kosovo, as far as I am aware, the truth was prevented from reaching the public. Much the same happened in Lika, in Croatia and in Serbia in 1971 and 1972." Druzijanic referred to that as "deformations of a division in the bureaucratic caste."

While the communists shout to one another over fences, the nationalists quietly advance. They do not bring people out into the streets. They do not organize student strikes, but attempt to dig in in the political system, in journalism and the newspaper business. "I must say that I have seen with my own eyes that they have in fact taken over in certain cultural institutions," Druzijanic said, emphasizing that "certain warriors from 1971 later obtained influential positions and rewards.

"I am constantly being assured that I am working for another community, I reply that they are both my community, but for a time they told me that I am an 'informer of the observation tower (dalekovidnice) in Belgrade.'" Druzijanic

objected to the "Belgrade press" giving too much space to a "certain journalist" from Zagreb who openly says that he is not a member of the party and often uses phrases like "clairvoyant manipulators" referring to party members and the League of Communists.

"There were several indications of differences that led to a stalemate. A problem has arisen of regionalization of the press, this certainly had the effect of reducing the flow of information.... It is an unwritten rule that in a community it must itself first settle accounts with 'some phenomenon' or at least it must begin to settle accounts. That culminated, as it was put by one very important figure in Slovenian--our and Slovenian--literature: 'Leave us in peace!'"

"In the divisions which we face in dramatic terms," Miroslav Stojanovic (POLITIKA) concluded, "newsgathering also suffers. Why are words used," he asks, "like schism, quarrelsome fellow, incidents? If every editorial office, including my own, swears that that is not its own editorial commitment, then how is it on the other side that the spreading of information is sometimes viewed as an expansionist act, as all but an act of conquest?"

In that context he also referred to certain fierce reactions. In one meeting of the Croatian republic SUBNOR [Federation of Associations of Veterans of the National Liberation War] a speaker mentioned that matches manufactured in Osijek were so designed that one could clearly see on them a "U" on a brown background, which because of the color and the letter strongly suggested the Ustashi. The news item was carried by several newspapers, but Josip Vrhovec actually accused POLITIKA of "hiding behind a participant in the discussion," and charged that the entire matter had been staged so as to create the impression that nationalism and the Ustasha spirit are raging once again in Croatia.

Stojanovic also spoke in this context about a kind of umbrella which is supposed to protect everything, even that which is negative. That type of oversensitivity to an oversensitive topic intentionally makes it seem more sensitive than it is.

"There will be times when a match will light, like those from Osijek. Mistakes are also possible, and abrupt reactions are also human. It seems to me, however, that it would be more important to first get beyond that phase in which differing views and an overemphasized temperament, and an erroneous assessment or nervous reaction will automatically be attributed to the malice of journalists and a wrongly conducted editorial policy. There have to be mistakes, but there ought to be confidence in the fact that editorial offices are run by members of the party," was the opinion of Mirko Djekic (NIN).

Several speakers concerned themselves with a recounting of Serbian nationalism.

Ratomir Vico (Radio [?]) advocated a discussion of nationalism by Yugoslav newsmen, expressing the opinion that many views of Serbian nationalists can be detected in journalism: the unitaristic idea of Yugoslavia without republics and provinces, strong-arm centralism, a Yugoslav nationality here and now, a language which all Yugoslavs would speak, and it is obvious which one, the

assertion about artificially created provinces, the "historical" assertion about the Albanians as the eternal enemy of the Serbian people, theses about the eternal separatism of the Croats, negation of the Muslim and Montenegrin nationalities, and so on.

At the same time, he feels, Serbian nationalism is also being nurtured by the nationalisms of others who identify the Serbs a priori with unitarianism in every fight for unity in Yugoslavia, and even when it is being led by the LC, unitaristic and Great Serbian ulterior motives are seen, the thesis that Serbia and the Serbs have been exploiting the others has been so magnified that the people of Sumadija are supposed to have lived like sheikhs, historical proofs are presented to the effect that the just and liberative wars of the Serbs were actually wars of conquest or they were mere tools of the great powers, arguments are made about how heavy the myth of Kosovo lies on the Serbian people, about the Serbs as enemies of the Albanians, the Croats and the Muslims, Vico observed.

The fight against nationalism, in the opinion of Djordje Radenkovic (POLITIKA), is hindered on the one hand by lukewarm attitudes and indecisiveness and on the other by ideological confusion. Ideological unity cannot be achieved by imposing certain opinions, but through free and analytical discussion in which people retain their dignity. This principle was not respected in the case of "The Pigeon Pit," which had greater reverberations than the pretext deserved. He also included among certain deviations of the struggle against nationalism the fact that POLITIKA had been charged with supposedly standing behind the "nationalistic pamphleteering" of "The Pigeon Pit," which is absolutely untrue! POLITIKA conscientiously published all opinions concerning "The Pigeon Pit," including the attacks on it.

In these discussions newsmen were actually assigned the status of naive Homo politicus, and they made frank answers to difficult questions! There were frequent sorties from the global and strategic issues into a field that obviously was strictly professional, as well as socially relative. Arguing for "respect of the profession, and for people to believe us," Dragan Nikitovic said that our news reporting must be honest. We have to be accountable for that truth. After that introduction he told how, for example, at a match between the women's soccer teams "Radnicki" and "Titograd" certain people came up to the soccer players, specifically to Kisicka and said "I will slash your face if you score a goal." I do not think that anyone in Titograd knows that, Nikitovic says, drawing from that sports scene something of the mental climate of the moment--"that is how far we have gone, we are invincible, we are euphoric...."

The fact that there were some 15 speakers, given that these are people who are otherwise concerned with their daily affairs, indicates at least two things. This kind of discussion is necessary and even indispensable to newsmen. Most of the speakers in fact said that--that it is good that the discussion has finally started. Aleksandar Djulejic noted that it is a pity that colleagues were not there from other communities. Many even proposed a "Yugoslavia-wide discussion."

That desire can also be explained from another viewpoint: up to now the newsmen have had occasion to listen to discussions about themselves and about society, presenting their own views only within their own party organizations. But even these (their own meetings in basic organizations of the League of Communists) were mainly limited to "specific cases" or campaigns. Thus the imperativeness of discussing a particular problem more often evoked defense mechanisms than it liberated creative energy.

This kind of occasion for discussion affords that measure of "constructive relaxation" which can liberate creativity. The success of the first meeting of this kind by the aktiv of newsmen who are party members shows that journalism as a profession is and will be a collective act.

The Events at Sokobanja

In the discussion in the Belgrade aktiv there were several criticisms of certain statements made in the assembly of Serbian newsmen. In accordance with our bad custom, we learned of the "events in Sokobanja" from a condemnation uttered in the section for the news media of the Serbian SAWP. But we did not learn the course which that assembly took. That is why in this collage on how "newspapermen are speaking out" we should also find place for this interpretation, especially since it represents a legitimate mode of discussion, though expressed in a personal tone, as well as the right to digress and to foam at the mouth in a democratic discussion. Where will the newsmen carry on a discussion if not in their own organization?

After a balanced report by Ljuba Rajnvajn and a speech by his colleague Milisav Milic, who reports from Kosovo, the first little sting dipped in honey was heard from the mouth of Ljubisa Manojlovic, who told a story about how a newspaperman died, and the commission for reduction of longevity took down his name, and there was a rush to resolve his housing problem, in Paradise or Hell--no matter which. But, alas, Paradise was closed, and there was no room in Hell, so that the newspaperman began to publish a newspaper on the stairway, and he received an invitation to both Paradise and to Hell.

I dreamed, Ljubisa Manojlovic said, that I had died, that I had begun to publish a newspaper on the stairway, all the time waiting for an invitation, but no pass came. It seems that I made a mistake, here on the stairway I have been publishing a satirical newspaper.

The sting from the very next newspaperman was less sugar-coated. Slobodan Stanojevic noted that we (newspapermen) have often come face to face with responsibility, yet the accountability of others is usually left for another time, and then resolutions are adopted which do not stand on two feet, but on one, and they are hobbled.

A Newsmen Is a Newsmen

The second question was still more direct: "Is it true that there is a news conflict between Belgrade and Novi Sad? If we want respect for dignity in our society and if we desire to contribute to overcoming certain shortcomings, let

us not wait for all the issues to be resolved by bodies of government, but rather we must aid the bodies of the party and government with a discussion of this. If something is a rumor to all of us, who is spreading the rumor? If it is reality, who is creating that reality, Stojanovic said.

Judging by the stories of the participants and by the traces in the transcript, the assembly became lively when Miroslav Radojcic, a newspaperman and world traveler for many long years, went to the speaker's stand and when he began to speak about the prestige of the profession: "We are ourselves at fault for our lack of prestige, since for all this time we have been great tightrope walkers, often, it must be said, acting as poltroons to the political structures. If newspapermen had as much prestige with the political structures as they do with their readers, this would be a good thing both for us and for the political structures. It is said of us that we want to be partners. I do not want to be a partner. A newsman is a newsman.

"I have heard many people go to the speaker's stand and say: 'At this moment of history.' I have seen so many historical moments, that I long for ordinary moments."

It seems that an unofficial report about the possible change of the editor in chief in his newspaper, which was first published in THE TIMES deeply offended the sense of professional honor of this newspaperman, and (I can hear him as I write) he said: "Do you know what it means to be the editor in chief of a newspaper?" and "The editor in chief of THE TIMES can be an assistant to Mr Eden, but an assistant to Mr Eden cannot be the editor in chief of THE TIMES, since journalism is a profession."

In spite of all the disagreements which have occurred or which will occur, this almost artistic self-respect, this homage to one's own profession, must be respected, perhaps because it is so rare in these latitudes.

Milutin Milenkovic nevertheless fears that this kind of attitude threatens to become a kind of professional chauvinism.

Miro Radojcic would explain the next day, after the storm of the first day had passed, that he is a man of feeling, that he loves his profession, and that his idea was exclusively professional, and not what we would call "certain other implications."

Petar Petrovic, a man different in temperament from Radojcic, spoke sharply:

"What bothers me as a man who works in this profession is the ease with which the guilt is accepted here in these documents and in the introductory address. That is the ease of a virtuoso. Yes, we are guilty, and it is all true. But are we really so much to blame? I think that that guilt laid down in so many layers, is not in proportion to the powers which we have in everyday life."

His colleague Dragan Jovanovic went over once again the topics already covered and added his profound concern about pressures on the press, about partnership: "Newsmen do not want to be partners with donors of Obrovaces, steel mills, cement plants, and so on."

Natasa Markovic made a remark that had a significant specific gravity; at one point she said that an association ought to be disbanded which at a time when the central committee was discussing the press after 30 years did not find it suitable in the preliminary discussion, which lasted so long, to organize a debate on this issue so important to the profession. The newspapermen's organization should have offered newspapermen who are not members of the party a chance for a dialogue, but not as in a cafe, but a dialogue in public, Natasa Markovic said. This truly seems a ridiculous commitment about opening up clubs. I wonder whether it suits someone for us to be bigger drunks than we are, she said.

As Milenkovic had done on the first day, on the second day Zivota Djordjevic took issue with certain extremes expressed in the most temperamental statements, while Dusko Djuric spoke after the fashion of "the dilemma is not whether the forums will be a bit more superior or the press a bit more independent, but how both the press and the forums are to be consistent in carrying out the action of social transformations."

Several colleagues, among them Djoki Mil'kovic, spoke rather convincingly, but without response, about how the news is inaccessible, incomplete, tailored by professional managers, that the vital information is often proclaimed to be a trade secret.

Veterans

The veterans provided a specific note of ironic wisdom. Predrag Milojevic went back to the past. The press has never been absolutely free. Then he told an anecdote about how TIME [?] (mentioned here) did not come out for a time since a certain industrialist who owned that paper did not agree with the paper's slant. Now it is coming out once again: the editors have promised that they will take the boss's demands into account, and the latter will be mindful of the paper's prestige.

There have always been errors, there have been some even on this occasion, Milojevic said; it is easy for newsmen to make mistakes, but I prefer a newsman to make a few mistakes than to spend a lot of time currying favor.

Slobodan Nesovic told how after the war Mosa called up Vlado Ribnikar because he was dissatisfied with the attributes of some parliamentary reporter, and Ribnikar answered him--he is a good comrade. The old man shouted: "Let the good comrades be sent where they belong, but on a newspaper you want good newsmen."

Between mythology and bitterness, between frustration and a certain unrestrained garrulousness, that picnic in Sokobanja had an unpleasant sequel. The first reactions from the Commission for Newsgathering of the SAWP were disturbing--opposition to the policy of a self-managing society, revival of liberalism, a surprising aggressiveness on the part of the group, a revival of liberalistic theses, they have been defeated, yet they think themselves to be victors, we have seen how they have arranged it, they used the veterans....

Before that picnic is covered with the dust of oblivion, as many previous assemblies of newsmen deserve, one impression should be stated--it is natural that newsmen put questions in their own association, including those which they do not know how to put otherwise than emotionally and a bit radicalistically.

Until recently there was actually some desire for discussion to be transferred from informal to organized meetings and associations. Now we have exactly that--an open discussion that at moments enters upon controversy. There is no reason to be disturbed by the differing tones which were heard there--they are a reflection of differing temperaments of differing experiences, of differing personality profiles. That discussion finally ended with a unanimous adoption of very constructive conclusions. Democracy can take that much risk--to hear at least a few dissonant tones.

There was even the reaction (one edition of KOMUNIST) that people from the section for newsgathering who 3 days later "described the case" under the second point on the agenda, since they were already there in Sokobanja, could have gone to the speaker's stand and helped the assembly to arrive at the right diagnoses and "put a stop to the unruly ones," if that was indeed their assessment.

This way, evaluation in the shadow of the office is based on the same "we" and "they" premises for which certain newsmen have been rightly criticized, and it casts a certain shadow. (One member of the section mentioned the word "dissidents" in presenting his impressions, and another said "Don't, comrades, use that word 'dissident,' not because of the foreign public, but because they do not feel themselves to be that, and they react to it--when I said to them 'dissidents' there in jest, when we were sitting at the same table, they jumped up and wanted to fight.")

Public speech is a very serious and subtle area, and protection of its prestige demands that the attitude toward it and the speech about it be well-thought-out. It will turn out (this goes beyond the limits of this obviously marginal case) that the "frontal combat" and warfare terminology can result in only apparent success, certain formal "differentiations," and probably also an unnecessary "production of enemies." The alternative might be an apathetic silence. But we are talking about authentic implementation of serious resolutions of the Central Committee.

The first part of this article said that the organization of journalists was attempting to employ its creative potential to arrive at individual and collective understanding of a moment in society that is complicated and dramatic. Resolving it will require, even in this part of the public sphere, bringing together the potential and preserving an atmosphere of reasonable dialogue. If there is to be a slap on the wrist at every step--then there will be no commitment.